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AN ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY
TO SECURITY CONSTRAINTS MANAGEMENT
IN POWER SYSTEM OPERATION

SHUBO ZHANG
ABSTRACT

In a deregulated electricity market, Independent System Operators (ISOs)
are responsible for dispatching power to the load securely, efficiently and economi
cally. ISO performs Security Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC) to guarantee
sufficient generation commitment, maximized social welfare and facilitating market

driven economics. The large number of security constraints would render the model
impossible to solve under time requirement. Developing a method to identify the

minimum set of security constraints without over committing is necessary to reduce
Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) solution time.

To overcome this challenge, we developed a powerful tool called security

constraint screening. The proposed approach effectively filters out non-dominating

constraints by integrating virtual transactions and capturing changes online in real
time or look-ahead markets. Security constraint screening takes advantage of both
deterministic and statistical methods, which leverages mathematical modeling and
historical data. Effectiveness is verified using Midcontinent Independent System Op

erator (MISO) data.
The research also presented a data-driven approach to forecast conges

tion patterns in real-time utilizing machine learning applications. Studies have been
conducted using real world data. The potential benefit is to provide the day-ahead

operators with a tool for supporting decision-making regarding modeling constraints.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................................

v

LIST OF TABLES.......................................................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES.....................................................................................................................................

ix

CHAPTER

I

II

III

IV

INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................

1

1.1

Background.......................................................................................................................

1

1.2

Solution Approach and Industrial Practice.................................................

6

1.3

Proposed Security Constraint Screening......................................................

8

1.4

Proposed Congestion Forecasting Tool..........................................................

10

1.5

Overview...........................................................................................................................

13

SECURITY CONSTRAINED UNIT COMMITMENT.....................................

15

2.1

SCUC Formulation

...................................................................................................

15

2.2

Security Constraint Formulation......................................................................

17

TWO-STEP SECURITY CONSTRAINT SCREENING . . . .. . .
3.1

Step 1: Necessary Condition of Transmission Line Congestion . .

3.2

Step 2: Linear Programming Based Offline Power Flow Maximiza

20
22

tion ........................................................................................................................................

24

3.3

Step 2: Dual Problem Based Online Screening

.....................................

25

3.4

Lazy Constraint Identification and Implementation.............................

31

3.5

Experimental Results ..............................................................................................

35

PRICE CONSTRAINTS

.. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . .

48

4.1

Price Constraint with LMP confidence Interval .....................................

53

4.2

Virtual Confidence Interval ..................................................................................

55

vi

V

STATIC ANALYSIS OF GENERATION AND LOAD DEVIATION

POST DISPATCH............................................................................................................................ 58

VI

VII

5.1

Generator Deviation and Load Side Uncertainty

5.2

Deviation and Security Constraint Screening Analysis on RTS96

58

.................................

System...............................................................................................................................

65

5.3

Post DAM SCUC Power InjectionSampling...............................................

67

5.4

Impact Index...................................................................................................................

70
75

CONTINGENCY SCREENING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1

Machine Learning Applications ..........................................................................

79

6.2

Deep Neural Network Experiment Results ...................................................

83

6.3

Classification Dominating Constraints..........................................................

88

6.4

Clustering Experiment Results ..........................................................................

90

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK .

. .

. .. .

. . .. .

.

92

7.1

Conclusions .......................................................................................................................

92

7.2

Future Work ...................................................................................................................

93

BIBLIOGRAPHY

. .. . .

. .. . .

. .

.. . .

. .. .

. . .. .

.

APPENDIX . . . . .. . .

. .. . .

. .

.. . .

. .. .

. . .. .

. 116

Code Documentation .

. .. . .

. .

.. . .

. .. .

. . .. .

. 117

98

1.1

General Requirement and Setup......................................................................

1.2

Security Constraint Screening andCongestion Forecasting Packages118

1.3

Top Level Scripts

.......................................................................................................

vii

117

122

LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table

1.1

Transmission Congestion Costs (in millions) for RTOs from 2016-2018

7

3.1

IEEE-118 Bus System Network/Security Constraint Screening Result

38

3.2

IEEE-118 Bus Test Case Network/Security Constraint Screening Per
formance Summary...............................................................................................................

40

3.3

MISO Case Security Constraint Screening Result

.........................................

42

3.4

Easy Case SCUC Solution Summary......................................................................

44

3.5

Hard Case SCUC Solution Summary......................................................................

45

4.1

Security Constraint Screening Without Virtual.................................................

55

5.1

Power Injection Deviation Affected by Load and Wind Generation . .

61

5.2

RTS-GMLC/IEEE-118 bus System Security Constraint Screening Re

sults ................................................................................................................................................

67

5.3

Power Flow Violation Severity Calculation ..........................................................

71

5.4

Power Flow Violation Frequency Calculation .....................................................

72

5.5

Power Flow Violation Impact Index Calculation .............................................

72

5.6

Impact Index Sorted from Highest to Lowest .....................................................

73

6.1

Enhanced SFT Test Result ..............................................................................................

80

6.2

DNN Dominating Constraint Prediction

..............................................................

87

6.3

Confusion Metric ...................................................................................................................

88

6.4

Classification Result

...........................................................................................................

89

6.5

Undersampled Kernel SVM Result

..........................................................................

90

1.1

Top Level Scripts of Congestion Forecasting......................................................

123

1.2

Security Constraint Screening Scenario List..........................................................

125

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure

1.1

Decomposition approach for SCUC..........................................................................

6

1.2

Congestion Forecasting Tool Implementation.....................................................

10

1.3

Congestion Forecasting Tool High Level WorkFlow.......................................

12

3.1

Lazy Constraint Explained..............................................................................................

32

3.2

Data-Aided screening with Lazy Constraints.........................................................

33

3.3

Aggregated Load Profile...................................................................................................

36

3.4

Offline-Online Screening Result (24 Hours)..........................................................

40

3.5

MISO Case Optimization Time Comparison......................................................

43

3.6

Case 1& 22 Optimization Time Comparison.....................................................

46

3.7

Case 21 MILP Gap Comparison..................................................................................

47

4.1

Using Virtual Confidence Interval to Reduce NetPower Injection. . .

56

5.1

Power Injection Deviation as a Function of Generation Deviation ...

59

5.2

Power Flow Bounds as a Function of Generator Deviation and Load
Deviation

...................................................................................................................................

60

5.3

Power Flow Deviation Associated with 7% Generation Deviation ...

62

5.4

Power Flow Deviation Distribution Associated with Various Genera
tion Deviation ...........................................................................................................................

63

5.5

Potential Binding Security Constraints Sorted by Violation Count . .

64

5.6

RTS96 Real-Time Load Deviation from DA Load Forecast.....................

66

5.7

Power Injection Interval

68

5.8

DAM SCUC Solution Set Variations

5.9

Post SCUC Power Injection Sampling and Power Flow Bounds Variation 70

...................................................................................................
......................................................................

5.10 Impact Index Plotted in Descending Order..........................................................

ix

69

73

5.11 Impact Index Distribution.............................................................................................

74

6.1

Enhanced SFT Module.......................................................................................................

76

6.2

Power Flow Bounds in SFT..........................................................................................

77

6.3

DA-RT Congestion Forecasting Workflow..............................................................

81

6.4

Machine Learning Module Work Flow......................................................................

82

6.5

Two-layer Neural Network Diagram..........................................................................

85

6.6

DNN on IEEE-118 Bus N-1 Contingency..............................................................

86

6.7

Power Flow Difference Comparison Actual vs. Predicted.........................

87

6.8

IEEE-118 Bus N-1 Contingency Clustering..........................................................

91

1.1

Congestion Forecasting Framework (online)..........................................................

122

1.2

Congestion Forecasting Framework (offline)..........................................................

130

x

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background

Electricity is the lifeblood of the modern world. Rapid economic develop
ment and production activities require reliable, affordable electricity. The US power

grid is one of the most complex, crucial infrastructure ever built in human history.

The power system includes more than 7300 power plants, nearly 160,000 miles of
high-voltage transmission lines, and millions of low-voltage transmission lines and

distribution transformers, which connect 145 million customers. In 2018, the revenue
of US electric power industry was 408.5 billion dollars, which is around 2% of US

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [1]. Before the 1990s, most investor-owned electric

utilities were regulated and vertically integrated. Owning both the generating units
and transmission lines created regional monopolies. It was not possible for customers

to purchase power elsewhere. As a result, the sell side sets the price and customers

take the price. In order for customers to get a fair electricity rates, state regulators
oversee how these electric utilities set electricity prices. Retail electricity prices in
these areas are set based on recovering the utility’s operating and investment costs,
including a fair rate of return on those investments [2-4].
Beginning in the 1990s, many states in the US decided to deregulate (re

structuring) their electricity systems to create competition and lower costs.

This

transition required electric utilities to sell their generating assets and led to the cre
ation of independent energy suppliers that owned generators. Because power lines
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are a natural monopoly, electric utilities held onto these assets to become transmis
sion and distribution utilities, and they continue to be regulated for these natural

monopoly functions. The biggest impacts resulting from deregulation were changes
to retail and wholesale electricity sales, with the creation of retail customer choice
and wholesale markets [5].

Energy markets are auctions that are used to coordinate the production of
electricity on a day-to-day basis.

In an energy market, electric suppliers offer to

sell the electricity that their power plants generate for a particular bid price, while
load-serving entities (the demand side) bid for that electricity in order to meet their
customers’ energy demand. Supply side quantities and bids are ordered in ascending
order of offer price. The market is cleared when the amount of electricity offered

matches the amount demanded, and generators receive this market price per megawatt

hour of power generated.

After deregulation, regional transmission organizations

(RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs) replaced utilities as grid operators

and became the operators of wholesale markets for electricity [6,7].

ISOs typically run two energy markets: the day-ahead markets (DAM) and

real-time markets (RTM). The day-ahead market, which represents about 95 percent
of energy transactions, is based on forecasted load for the next day and typically

occurs the prior morning in order to allow generators to prepare for operation. The
remaining energy market transactions take place in the real-time market, which is

typically run once every hour and once every five minutes to account for real-time

load changes that must be balanced at all times with supply [8,9].
Energy markets are used by ISOs to determine which units to dispatch, or
run, and in what order. In the day-ahead market, ISOs compile the list of generators
available for next-day dispatch and order them from least expensive to most expen

sive to operate. Dispatching units by lowest cost allows the market to meet energy

demand at the lowest possible price. During periods of high demand, wholesale prices
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rise accordingly because more high-cost units need to be dispatched in order to meet

the electric load. ISO performs Security Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC) to

guarantee sufficient generation commitment, maximized social welfare and facilitating
market driven economics. SCUC is formulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Program

ming (MILP) problem. Security constraint is mathematical formulation representing
power delivered by transmission lines must be kept under thermal limit during any
particular contingency. The large number of security constraints would render the

model impossible to solve under time requirement. The development of a method

to reduce MILP solution time by identifying the minimum set of security constraints

without undercommitting is imperative [10—19].
Security Constrained Unit Commitment refers to the economic scheduling of

generating units for serving the hourly load demand while satisfying temporal and

operational limits of generation and transmission facilities in power systems. In a

vertically integrated utility, regulatory departments apply SCUC for minimizing the

operating cost. However, in deregulated market, SCUC is utilized by ISOs/RTOs
to clear real-time and day-ahead markets. The objective of SCUC is to maximize

the social welfare’s based on energy and price bids submitted by market participants,

generation supplier and load demands. SCUC is discussed extensively in the literature
and well implemented in daily power system operation [20], [21]. It is a challenging
task to obtain optimal solution in an acceptable time due to the enormous size of the

problem. In general, SCUC must satisfy the following constraints [21-23]:
•

system-wide power balance

•

generation unit physical limits

•

spinning and operating reserve requirements

•

generation unit minimum on/off constraints

•

generation unit start-up/shut-off characteristics
3

bus voltage limits
•

transmission flow constraints

•

system operation constraints for credible contingencies

SCUC, by nature, is a non-convex and large scale mixed integer optimization

problem. It belongs to the np-hard problem class. Recent improvements in model
ing, optimization solver, and efficient algorithm enable system operators to obtain

optimal or near-optimal solutions. The SCUC problem can be solved by Lagrangian
Relaxation (LR) and Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP). Performance com

parisons can be found in [24]. MISO has adopted MILP approach for the Co-optimized

Energy and Ancillary Service Market since 2009 [25—30]. Day Ahead Market (DAM)
is a financial market, and the market-clearing process requires solving SCUC problem
for all planned operation periods. A near-optimal solution must be obtained within

the timeframe.
In DAM, security constraints are defined as power flow transmission constraint

for transmission lines considering N-1 security rule according to North American Elec

tric Reliability Corporation (NERC). There are over, 15000 security constraints for
mulated for MISO’s DAM. Incorporating all security constraints in the model could

cause computational intractability, which means optimality and solution time re
quirements cannot be guaranteed. Reducing non-binding hard constraints often help

reduce solution time for MILP problems. The goal of this research is to effectively
reduce the size of security constraint set in the SCUC model and improve solution

quality, while maintaining solution integrity. From experience, only a small fraction
of security constraints are binding. MISO identified over 500 routinely binding and

critical security constraints per interval, known as ”watchlist”. Additional constraints

may be identified and added to watchlist through the interaction between Simultane
ous Feasibility Test (SFT) [31-34] and DAM Security Constrained Economic Dispatch

(SCED) [20,21,35,36].
4

Figure 1.1 illustrates the typical approach to handle SCUC by decomposing

the original problem into master problem and subproblems [24, 34, 37-39]. It is an
iterative approach. In addition to the constraints mentioned previously, the master
problem contains hundreds and thousands of security constraints as well. Solving the

master problem will determine the base case unit commitment. Subproblems take
the base case solution to evaluate whether any network constraints (power flow con

straints in base case topology) or security constraints (power flow constraints in any
creditable contingency) cause violation. Violated constraints will be added back to

the master problem and be solved again. As a criterion for convergence/termination,

there must be no more violations of constraints. Finally, the master problem solution
is the optimal unit commitment and dispatch subject to all the physical limits and

robust against all the creditable contingencies. This approach may require quite a

few iterations to reach convergence, and each iteration may take longer than the pre

vious one. Typically, ISOs require DAM SCUC to be solved under 20 minutes with
less than 0.1% MILP gap. This approach usually cannot guarantee feasibility if too
many contingencies are included. Therefore, empirical and heuristic approaches are
applied to select the creditable contingencies. Security constraints may be overlooked

in DAM SCUC, and become binding in real-time SCUC, resulting in divergence be
tween markets and reduced social welfare. However, due to the simplistic nature, it
is still being implemented as a typical industrial practice.

5

Figure 1.1: Decomposition approach for SCUC
Watchlist security constraints is an empirical approach to handle long solution
time. It can be inaccurate and heavily dependent on operator’s experience. Secu

rity constraint that is excluded in DAM and becomes binding in RTM will create

congestion cost. It is an indicator that the SCUC model ran in DAM is not robust

against uncertainty and contingency can create sub-optimal solution. Transmission
congestion occurs when there is insufficient transmission capacity to deliver lower-

cost generation resources to consumers, requiring the use of higher-cost generators
closer to customers [40—42]. This increases the price of electricity in congested ar

eas, as reflected in higher locational marginal prices and higher electricity prices for

consumers [6,43—49]. Table 1.1 shows the transmission congestion costs for Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) from 2016-2018 [50]. The goal of this research

is to develop a method to find the minimal set of security constraints that can help
decrease MILP solution time, while maintaining solution robustness against all N-1

contingencies.

1.2

Solution Approach and Industrial Practice
The overwhelming number of security constraints have attracted much atten-
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RTO

2016

2017

2018

ERCOT
ISO-NE
MISO
NYISO
PJM
SPP

497
38.9
1400
529
1023.7
273.7

976
41.4
1500
481
697.6
405.3

1260
64.5
1400
596
1310
380.9

Total

3762.3

4101.3

5011.3

Table 1.1: Transmission Congestion Costs (in millions) for RTOs from 2016-2018

tion in literature. The concept of Umbrella constraint is introduced in [51] and [52].

The umbrella constraints are dominating constraints and defined as the minimum
set of constraints that shapes the feasibility region of the original problem. Binding
constraints is a subset of umbrella constraints, which can only be determined after
solving the original MILP problem. Authors in [53] propose an efficient method to

eliminate non-active constraints in standard SCUC and [54,55] further take uncer
tainty into consideration. The author in [56] developed methods to eliminate large

numbers of linear security constraints in the high-dimensional mixed-integer SCUC

problem. Heuristic approaches are applied to remove potentially non-binding con

straints in [34] and [38], which addresses the conservatism caused by large number
of constraints that are maybe non-binding in nature, but dominating in the reduced

constraint set. It is seen that warm start and setting proper lazy constraint could
improve the SCUC solution performance [57, 58]. Our work in this proposal is an

extension of [53—55].
Congestion management is an important subject for grid operators. Conges

tion occurs when there is a lack of transmission line capacity to deliver electricity
without exceeding thermal, voltage and stability limits designed to ensure system re

liability [59—68]. Congestion in ISO wholesale markets is managed through Security
Constrained Economic Dispatch by providing Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs).

Grid operators and market participants can see where congestion results in high
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prices and act accordingly. Thus, accurate forecasting of congestion is important for
decision-making. The ISOs run a two settlement market, that is, there are two sets
of LMPs for each node, one in the Day-Ahead Market (DAM) and the second in

the Real-Time Market (RTM). Congestion in the DAM may not match that in the

RTM due to various reasons, such as outages or topology changes. Inconsistent con

straints modeling between day-ahead (DA) and real-time (RT) could lead to financial
divergence, operational issues, and uneconomic commitments. Constraints binding
in real-time but which are not modeled in day-ahead, may lead to significant excess
congestion funding (ECF). This results in inefficiency in the market. Congestion fore

casting could help lower the financial divergence, as well as improve the commitment
solution in the DAM [69—80].

1.3

Proposed Security Constraint Screening
We aim to reduce SCUC problem size by reducing security constraints set in

the SCUC formulation. We propose a two-step screening approach to identify and
eliminate non-dominating security constraints. Step 1 is a numerical method that
employs necessary conditions to identify the potential dominating security constraints.

Step 2 solves an LP problem to find the truly dominating constraints that further

shrinks the pool of potentially dominating security constraints.
We also introduce a data-aided lazy constraint setting to further improve the

performance. The contributions of this proposal are three-fold. First, we proposed

a data-driven approach to determine the confidence interval of net power injection
for the calculation of power flow. Second, we employed lazy constraints to resolve

potential inaccuracy issue caused by data driven approach. Third, we carried out
simulations and validate the performance using the real data from MISO.

A data drive approach is employed. Persistent study was performed on MISO
historical data.

Previous day generation were used to predict the next day unit
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commitment and dispatch. The range of net power injections on individual buses

were narrowed down, resulting in even fewer security constraints. The inaccuracy
resulted by statistical approach was addressed by lazy constraint setting in the solver.
Varies warm start strategies in combination with security constraint screening and

data driven approach were tested on real data from MISO.
The contribution of this research includes:

1) A two-step approach to identify the dominating security constraints in SCUC
formulation. Step 1 is deterministic method. Step 2 requires solving a group of

LP problem, which is time-consuming, offline method used to pre-process the
model to extract key features. Most conservative approach implemented were

based on the asset’s physical limitation. Online method benefited from the solu
tion of offline method. It used numerical method to rapidly determine whether
a security constraint has the potential of being dominating in the model.
2) Proposed the offline and online application of the two step security constraints

method. The offline method pre-processes the model to extract key features.

Most conservative approaches were implemented based on the asset’s physical
limitation. Online method benefited from the solution of the offline method.
It used a numerical method to rapidly determine whether a security constraint

has the potential of being dominating in the model.
3) Unit commitment status, dispatch quantity, and virtual power injection infor

mation were approximated by a data-driven approach to overcome the conser
vatives of net power injection interval, which was usually calculated according
to unit minimum and maximum output. An optimistic dominating constraint

set was derived. Lazy constraints were flagged in the optimization model to
address the inaccuracy caused by the optimism from statistical methods.

4) Performed generator, virtual and load deviation analysis after solving base case
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SCUC. The result of the deviation analysis was used to construct a pool of
potentially binding security constraints in real time.

5) Evaluated the financial impact of a constraint if it became binding in real time.
6) Implemented price constraint (budget of uncertainty) after solving base case
SCUC. The price constraint will further reduce the number of potentially bind
ing constraint in real time.
7) Developed a machine learning module that was capable of determining the

power flow upper/lower bounds of potentially binding constraints.
Figure 1.2 shows the implementation timeline of the proposed methods.

Figure 1.2: Congestion Forecasting Tool Implementation

1.4

Proposed Congestion Forecasting Tool

DAM is a forward market, which determines the optimal commitment and dis
patch for the next day electricity market, through Security Constrained Unit Commit
ment (SCUC) and Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED). Moreover, for

each hour, contingency analysis is conducted by Simultaneous Feasibility Test (SFT).

DA market utilizes forecasted load, forecasted renewable power, planned generator
outages and credible contingencies to best estimate the state of the power system
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for the next day. However, due to forecasting error and uncertainties, RT market

diverges from DA planning. The gap between the two markets, or divergence, creates
market inefficiency.

In recent years, machine learning techniques have been implemented in the

power system operation field to tackle the problem of cyberattack detection, volt
age instability, and power quality disturbance. Traditional deterministic approaches
cannot deliver solutions in acceptable time given the large and complex power trans

mission network. The demand to summon a quick and relatively accurate solution
becomes a dominating force that drives the development of heuristic methods in the

modern power system [81—93]. Optimal power flow problem is a large scale root find

ing problem that is directly tied to the stability of the system. It is typically solved by

deterministic methods such as Newton-Raphson, Gaussian-Seidel, nonlinear program

ming and interior point methods. Heuristic methods include swarm and bio-inspired,
evolutionary-inspired, and hybrid optimization techniques [94—96]. Load forecasting
and renewable forecasting have been a traditional strong field utilizing machine learn

ing techniques [97—101]. Short term forecasting has proven to be conservative and

reliable. However, long term load forecasting is more investigated in the planning
period instead of day to day operation.

The goal of the research is to create a tool that estimates the gap between DA
and RT markets, and offers a solution that is robust against the worst contingencies,

yet the cost is within financial budget. Figure 1.3 illustrates the high level work flow
of the congestion forecasting tool. It is, to the author’s best knowledge, this is a novel
approach to quantify the markets’ divergence.
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Figure 1.3: Congestion Forecasting Tool High Level Work Flow
The goal of the congestion forecasting tool is to use day-ahead market in
formation and forecasted real-time information to predict the security constraints

that can be binding in real time. The overall strategy is composed of two parts, i.e.
deterministic portion (power flow analysis) and heuristic portion (machine learning).

1. Deterministic portion: Utilizing solutions from DAM SCUC, SFT and twostep security constraints screening methods to outline the potentially binding
security constraint pool.

2. Machine learning portion: With forecasted information fed to the deep neural
network, we calculated the power flow upper and lower bounds of all potentially

congested lines, which are determined from deterministic portion. Furthermore,
we calculated the probability of a line becoming binding in real time.

3. Analysis: The probability of a constraint becoming binding, as well as the

impact of the constraint, can be calculated using a "severity index”. In real
time operations, system operators can refer to the severity index to determine

what constraints to be aware of.
The sequence of congestion forecasting tool execution is,
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1. Solve DAM SCUC (base case).
2. Execute the enhanced SFT module with (pre-selected) credible contingencies.
3. Apply security constraint screening protocols to determine the potentially bind

ing constraint pool.

4. Use forecasted data and potentially binding constraints as input to the machine
learning algorithm to determine the real time binding constraints with severity

analysis.

1.5

Overview
The dissertation follows the following structure. Section II presents the classical

SCUC formulation. In section III, a security constraint screening method and its

offline-online implementation are presented. Historical data and lazy constraints are
employed to tighten the security constraint pool in the optimization model. Lazy con

straint settings are incorporated in the optimization solver. On IEEE-118 and MISO
test cases, the proposed screening method, data drive approach, and varying warm

start strategies are implemented to solve DAM SCUC. Section IV proposes the price

constraint that addresses the economic concerns in the security constraint screen
ing process. The virtual confidence interval considers market participant behavior
and strategy, which provides economic insights and shrinks the energy traded in the
day-ahead market. Section V discusses the static analysis of the consequences when a

market participant does not follow the system operator’s order. Derived impact index
of security constraint can provide system operator a metric when considering which

ones are more likely to bind in real time and exert more stress on the system. Section

VI proposes a contingency screening framework (congestion forecasting) utilizing ma

chine learning techniques. The classification algorithm can detect potentially binding

constraints in real time, and a regression model was used to predict the power flow
13

bounds of the targeted constraints. The paper concludes with Section VII, which
discusses future work that can improve and tighten the proposed model to bridge the
divergence between day ahead and real time market.
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CHAPTER II
SECURITY CONSTRAINED UNIT COMMITMENT

2.1

SCUC Formulation
This section shows the classic SCUC formulation. M, I, L and T denotes the

sets of buses, generators, transmission lines and planning period. Generators have

convex production cost curve, and usually modeled as a piecewise function with a set
of k segments.

(2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)
(2.6)
(2.7)
(2.8)
(2.9)

(2.10)
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(2.11)
(2.12)
(2.13)
(2.14)
(2.15)
(2.16)
(2.17)
(2.18)

(2.19)

(2.20)
(2.21)
(2.22)

(2.23)
(2.24)
(2.25)

The objective function (2.1) is a minimization of generator production cost.
Iit is the on/off status indicator for generator i at hour t. Ni0 is the no-load cost.

ICik is the kth incremental cost from piecewise linear approximation of the generator

cost curve. Equation (2.2) is the load balance constraint, where power produced by
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individual generators, pit, must match the overall load demand, Dt, for each planned
period.

(2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) are the resource limitations, generator output must

be within its physical limits, Pimιn and Pimax. yit and zit are the start-up/shut-down
indicators for generator i at hour t. (2.6) is the logic constraint that links unit status
with start-up/shut-down action. (2.7) establishes the mutually exclusive relationship

between start-up and shut-down action.

(2.8) and (2.9) are cost constraints that

are associated with start-up/shut-down action, where csuit and csdit are the cost
variables.

(2.10) to (2.14) are reserve constraints.

srit/orit is spinning/operating

reserve variable co-optimized with power generation. SRt/ORt is the hourly reserve

requirement. Spinning reserve is a apart of generation capacity. (2.10) establishes
that such relationship, power and reserve provided by a generator cannot exceed its

physical limit. Spinning reserve is constrained by deliverability, as shown in (2.11).
Operating reserve is provided by spinning reserve (online) and offline reserve (2.12).

Sufficient system-wide reserve, SRt∕QRt, must be met in (2.13) and (2.14). (2.15)
and (2.16) are ramping constraints, where RUi∕RDi is the ramp-up/ramp-down limit
of the generator i.

If the generator starts-up or shut-down, minimum generation

requirement must be satisfied, otherwise, ramping limits must be respected. (2.17) to
(2.24) are the generator minimum on/off requirements, NT, UT,DT are the number
of periods, uptime and downtime of the generator, MU and MD are the minimum

uptime and minimum downtime constants. (2.25) is the security constraint that is
discussed in details in the next section.

2.2

Security Constraint Formulation

The power flow fι in line l can be calculated based on equation as (2.26). The
literature in [102] discussed the formulation and implementation extensively.

(2.26)

17

where Γl,m is the shift factor element, for line l with respect to bus m. Shift
factor is the sensitivity of the line flows to the change in injections at the buses. It
is calculated as follows. For generality, line and bus subscripts l,m are ignored. f
is the power flow vector for ∣L∣ branches, Pinj is the power injection vector for M

buses.

K

l

is the bus to branch incidence matrix, dimension is ∣M∣×∣L∣. X is the

branch reactance matrix and the dimension is ∣L∣×∣L∣. c is the branch-phase shifter
incidence matrix, while the dimension is ∣L∣× a number of phase shifters. γ is the
phase angle vector, which is a number of phase shifters ×1.

(2.27)
(2.28)
(2.29)
(2.30)

where

(2.31)

The dimension of shift factor matrix Γ, is ∣L∣×∣M∣. Shift factor shows how the
flow in the branch will change if the injection at the bus changes by 1 MW. Because

the reference bus always makes up for the change in the injection, shift factor values

are dependent on the location of the reference bus. For detailed formulation and
calculation methods, please refer to [21,103—106].
Pm is the net power injection at bus m, calculated as follows,

(2.32)

where Pi is the generator’s dispatch, Pvk is virtual bid/offer, Dn is the fixed
18

demand, and Dflex is the price-sensitive demand. i,j,n and f are indices for generator,
virtual, fixed demand, and price-sensitive demand, respectively.
Security constraints are power flow constraints under particular contingencies.

The formulation is the same as (2.25), except that shift factor matrix and power injec
tion are updated. A line outage will change network topology, which means the shift

factor matrix needs to be recalculated to produce different power flow constraints.
Generators can also be disconnected from the grid due to a line outage; dispatch in
base case is no longer viable. Hence, SCUC usually accounts for N-1 line outage con
tingencies to ensure operation security, i.e. power deliverability under contingency.

Power flow under contingency must be within its contingeny limit, i.e,

Fi ≤ fι ≤ Fι

(2.33)

For example, in IEEE-118 bus test system, there are 186 transmission lines. Thus,

the number of N-1 security constraints that needs to be included in SCUC formulation
is 69,192 = (186 + 186*185)*2, per period. For a real-world power grid with 3,000

transmission lines, 18 million security constraints needs to be modeled per period.
SCUC models are impossible to solve with such constraint set. ISOs generally develop

a security constraint watchlist from experience and heuristic method. In order to get
a converged solution under time restriction, only hundreds of security constraints can
be included for each time interval in the SCUC model. A driving force behind this

research is the desire to guarantee security and improve solution quality.
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CHAPTER III
TWO-STEP SECURITY CONSTRAINT SCREENING
It is a challenge to deal with the large number of security constraints in real
world systems. Some ISOs/RTOs develop special procedures to identify creditable

security constraints and add only those constraints into the DAM SCUC model. Iter

ative approaches are often employed to conduct Simultaneous Feasibility Test (SFT)
so that any additional security constraint causing violation can be added to the model
eventually. For instance, MISO evaluates outages and other relevant information to

build the watchlist, which is a much smaller subset of the full set of security con
straints. However, the system operator may still confront situations where the opti

mization engine cannot find an acceptable solution within the time limit. There is
an emerging and practical need to find acceleration techniques to improve the opti

mization performance. In this section, we present a two-step approach to build the
watchlist.

The two-step method introduced in this proposal is able to identify the dom
inating constraints in the watchlist, and the watchlist constraints are reduced to its

least set. Online method takes advantages of the dual variable of the dominating
security constraints. Upper limit of power flow can be checked as soon as net power

injection becomes available.
Persistence studies were conducted on the generator output on MISO system
and previous day commitment is used to make predictions for current day commit

ment. Implementation of statistical method can further reduce the conservatives of

20

dominating watchlist security constraint set. To resolve the constraints that may
have been overlooked, we would check the power flow and set more tolerances in the
commercial MILP solver to be lazy.

Step 1 is based on Theorem 3 from [54] stating the necessary condition for

line congestion, to effectively identify potentially dominating security constraints set,

denoted as J1, J1 ⊆ U.

U is the watchlist security constraint set. In Step 1, it

requires power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) and net power injection. We have

to consider uncertainty into the interval of net power injection, which is calculated

based on generating unit’s physical limitation, virtual power bid/offer and forecast
ed load. Step 1 is numerical method, it is computationally effective and can take

advantage of parallel processing.
Step 2 is inspired by Theorem 2 of [53] where a security constraint is inactive

if and only if the feasible region of the problem is unaffected by eliminating/adding
the constraint. Dominating security constraints are governed by topology; they are
independent of SCUC problem and are all linear constraints. Step 2 determines the

maximum power flow on a branch by solving a Linear Programming (LP) problem in

respect to all other security constraints and load balance constraint. If the resulting

power flow is beyond transmission capacity limit, the security constraint is a dominat
ing constraint, otherwise redundant. Truly dominating constraints set resulted from

step 2 is denoted as J2. We have the following set relationship Jb ⊆ J2 ⊆ J1 ⊆ U,

where JB is the binding security constraint set that can only be obtained after opti
mization.

Step 2 can be extended to offline/online methods. Offline method uses net

power injection interval in relation to resource physical limits and maximum virtual
bidding quantity, determining a dominating constraint set. Feasibility set remains
unchanged if real time net power injection falls within the range. Dual variable, λ, is
calculated and stored while solving the offline method. Online method is implemented
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when real time net power injection becomes available, the upper bound of power flow,

fι, can be calculated. To maintain conservativeness, we can consider that the potential
of a security constraint is binding as a fraction between fl and Fl, represented by an
arbitrary variable, α. If

F

≥

α, security constraint l is considered as potentially

binding, otherwise, possibly redundant. Then it would be set as a lazy constraint in

the SCUC calculation.

3.1

Step 1: Necessary Condition of Transmission Line Congestion

Given the PTDF and relative accurate load forecasting, net power injection

interval solely depends on generator commitment and virtual bid/offer. In order to

identify all the potentially dominating constraints, we choose the most conservative
approach to determine net power injection interval by taking the physical limits of

generator output and max/min of virtual bid/offer. The maximum and minimum net

power injections are as the follows:

(3.1)
(3.2)

Net power injection interval is ∆P injm = Pm — Pmj, where overlme/underlme

represent the maximum/minimum physical limits, respectively.

With the net power injection, we can apply Theorem 3 in [54] to determine
those non-binding constraints. For self-contained, we present the result directly here.
Denote Pv =

- ∑m pm

and f∣ =

1

Γι,mPffi. If there exists an integer j
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∈ [1, Nct]

such that,
(3.3)
(3.4)

(3.5)

Denote the remaining security constraint set as J1. According to our experi

ence in real systems, J1 are still with considerable size, and many constraints in J1

are not binding at the optimal point. Hence, we employed a data-driven method to
tighten the remaining sets by leveraging historical data. The goal was to determine

the 95% confidence interval of generator output, which can be substituted in (3.1)
and (3.2). The new upper and lower bound of net power injection are denoted as

P^* ,Ρ™*, respectively. The new net power injection interval,

denote the set of new remaining security constraints as J1*. Due to the smaller net

power injection,

1

Ί 1

τ,.

1

....

. Ί

r-^inj*

7-uni*1

1

T÷

■ 1

.

holds. If the true net power injection is outside [Pm ,Pmnj ], then J1 might miss

binding constraints. To address this issue, we employed the lazy constraint set

in the optimization engine. Lazy constraints will be discussed in Section 3.4.
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3.2

Step 2: Linear Programming Based Offline Power Flow Maximization

J1 detected by Step 1 are the potentially dominating security constraints, and

the redundancy still exists. We applied the procedure two to further tighten security
constraint set. An LP model is formulated. The objective was to maximize the fι
respecting all other security constraints in J1. l is a dominating constraint if and only

if fl > Fl. It is formulated as,

where equation (3.7) is the power balance constraint. It is equivalent to ∑n Pn =
∑2d Dd, but in a slightly different format. M is the set of bus indices. F is the power
flow limit. We were able to identify the power flow violation as long as the network

topology and lower/upper bound of net power injection were available. This feature
enables wide range of applications. Theorem 3 in [54] is also based on the net power

injection model, although identification rate might not be as high as problem (C). For

simplicity, we do not present the power flow in negative direction, which is similar.
It is time-consuming to solve thousands of LPs like (C). As we are only

interested in whether fι > Fι holds, it is not necessary to completely solve problem
(C). Instead, we can solve problem (C*), which is a feasibility check for the optimized

model. The model will be infeasible if constraint (3.14) conflicts with others, which
means the maximum power flow on l cannot be greater than its power flow limit.
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Hence, a security constraint l is not a dominating constraint, and vice versa.

3.3

Step 2: Dual Problem Based Online Screening

Offline optimization requires solving ∣J1∣ LP problems to identify the non

congested lines. The computational burden could be large in multi-period scheduling
problems for the real-world power systems. The online identification to tackle the

computational challenge is performed based on closed form equations without solving

optimization problem. At the offline optimization stage, load/net power injection
information is assumed not precise. In contrast, more information will be available at

the online calculation stage in real time. In the following section, we present online

screening methods capturing both net power interval change and network topology
update.

3.3.1

Online Method in the Abstract Form

First, we write the problem (C) in an abstract form,

(C’)

min
x

s.t.

(3.15)

cτx
Ax ≤ b,

(λ)

(3.16)

where c denotes the sensitivity factor vector for the security constraint under investi
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gation, -{Γl m}, x denotes net power injection vector, P'fl', and b denotes parameters
-^inj

in (C) including Pm , — Pmj, Fy etc. We change the maximization problem to a min

imization one by multiplying the objective function by —1.
At online stage, more accurate net power injection will be available. Consider

realized load/generation b. The question then arises as to how to find the new upper
bound of power flow with b. Theoretically, one could solve (C’) with updated b.

However, it involves more computational burdens. Instead, we will use a closed form
to find the upper bound instead of solving an LP problem. The dual form of problem
(C’) is

Theorem III.1 Denote the optimal point to (D) as λ*.

With updated net power

injection data b, an upper bound of power flow in branch l is

Proof. Following duality theory, we have

where x and λ are feasible in (C’) and (D), respectively. Denote optimal solution to
(C’) and (D) as x* and λ*. According to strong duality,

holds. When b is updated to b, we denote the optimal points as x and A . It is
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observed that x* might be infeasible in problem (C’), however, λ* is always feasible
in (D). Therefore,
(3.20)

holds. According to (3.20), bτλ* is the upper bound of power flow in branch l with
updated net power injection data b.

■

It is noted that optimal dual point λ* to (D) is a byproduct of solving (C’).

Most LP solvers provide λ* when solving (C’).
One may conjecture that uncertainty could be considered at offline optimiza
tion stage by setting b large enough so that

(3.21)

holds. x* is feasible for all b in this case. However, it might have poor performance
due to the large interval of net power injections. Theorem 1 holds even when b does

not follow (3.21). The proposed offline-online procedure thus provides an option to
find tighter upper bound of power flow.

3.3.2

Practical Formulation with Updated Net Power Injection Interval
In the real-time market, many uncertainties are materialized. The load fore

cast for next hours is more accurate than that in DAM. The predication of renewable

generation is also with smaller errors. Furthermore, ON/OFF status for many gen
erators are already known for next hours. This information can be utilized to narrow
ninj

-r>inj

the net power injection. More specifically, Pmj and Pm in equation (3.9) will be
updated to capture the materialized information.
Instead of solving another LP problem with an updated constraint, we present

a computationally efficient way to find the new largest power flow. Offline method
requires solving problem (C) for each security constraint, which gives the maxi
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mized power flow fzoff, optimal net power injection P^* and, dual variables, i.e.,

λz*,αz*∕,βm*,βr+*∙ In fact, most modern optimization solver will provide dual values

after solving problem (C). To show how to utilize dual values, we formulate dual
problem (E) of (C) below and denoted its optimal value as fzd(Pi"", P'"").

(3.22)

(3.23)

(3.24)
(3.25)

where P"", P'nj are lower and upper bound vectors for all net power injections.
It is noticed that fzd(Pin", P'"") is a function of Pin" and P'"".
It is observed that optimal dual values of (C), i.e. λz*,αz*∙■

<-■<+,

are always

feasible in (E) no matter what upper and lower bounds of net power injections are.
i

1

ii

The updated upper and lower bounds are denoted as Pm and Pm , respectively. We
define fzon as

(3.26)

According to duality theory,

holds. Therefore, fzon is an upper bound of power flow online l. In other words,
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we can determine the upper bound of the maximal power flow using the closed-form

equation (3.26). According to our experience, this upper bound is tight enough to
remove the majority of industrious constraints in real-world systems.

3.3.3

Updated Network Topology

The method aforementioned works when there is no topology change. In this
part, our goal was to quickly determine whether post line contingency power flow
will cause congestion. Line outage distribution factor LODFml→ol can be quickly

calculated as shown in [107], where ml → ol represents monitored lines to outage
C
lines. ιie- / post-contingency power flow, J ml ∖Jml , rrmst respect branch flow
limits,
1

Fml. They are typically modeled as

(3.27)
(3.28)

The traditional approach calculates post-contingency power flow from pre

contingency power flow. The proposed approach verifies congestion potential of mon

itored lines over an injection range, ∆Pmj*. The pre-contigency net power injection
is denoted as ∕',m' . ∆Pmj* can be calculated around Pmn* by factoring in topology

change, load forecasting error, generator ramping rates and participation as below

(3.29)

where Ri is ramping rate. Consider post-contingency power flow change due to ∆P,]Jj*

(3.30)

where Γol is outage lines’ shift factors extracted from base case. The new power
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flow is

(3.31)
Together with

(3.32)

we can directly apply the proposed two-step screening to determine potential domi

nating security constraints in post contingency situation.
Topology changes discussed here can only account for line-outage contingen

cies and cannot account for N-1 generator contingencies. The question might arise

whether this method can account for a practical SCUC loss scenario when a generator
is lost. The proposed two-step method is based on the DC model considering Injection

Shift Factor (ISF). Line-outage contingencies would change system topology, altering
the ISF matrix, resulting in new/different security constraints. A generator outage,
on the other hand, would not affect the ISF matrix, nor generating new security con

straints. It will only change the net power injection on the designated bus. Since
we are taking the conservative approach to estimate net power injection intervals,
on a bus with generator, it would be between zero and max output power. MISO

uses generator participation factor in the case of generator outage by re-allocating

the missing amount of energy to nearby units. This action would not change system
topology, and our conservative approach on net power injection interval would not be
violated, since the generators that pick up the slack also needs to be capped by its
own physical limitation.
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3.4
3.4.1

Lazy Constraint Identification and Implementation

Motivation behind Lazy Constraint
The proposed two-step screening approach can significantly reduce the size of

U in the SCUC model. However, only a portion of J2 is binding at the solution point.

The active constraints at the solution point were denoted as JB. The question that
naturally arises is how we can effectively shrink the size of J2 to an approximation
of JB without jeopardizing the security. This challenge can be tackled exactly by

the concept of lazy constraint. Lazy constraints are designed to incorporate user

confidence in the optimization model to improve solution quality. Constraints that are
believed to be less probable to bind at the optimal solution can be marked as lazy. The
model is initially optimized without any lazy constraints. Once a solution is found,

the lazy constraints are checked with the current solution. If any lazy constraints

are violated, they will be added back to the reduced model. Optimization process
continues till an optimal solution is found without any lazy constraint violations.

Users should exercise the best judgement to mark lazy constraints, since the intention
of lazy constraints is to shrink constraints set and optimize a smaller and easier model.

On the other hand, if it is set inappropriately, it may require more iterations to restore
the lazy constraints, causing solution time to increase.
It is crucial to separate screening result J2 into the active constraint pool
Jact, and lazy constraint pool Jlazy, where Jact U Jlazy = J2 and Jact ∩ Jlazy = 0. If

the active pool is over-conservative, Jact ≈ J2, performance improvement would be
negligible. If the pool is over-optimistic, JB\ Jact ⊆ Jlazy is large and more constraints

are added back in the MILP searching process, which may increase solution time, as
illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Relationship Amongst Binding Constraint, Active Constraint and Lazy
Constraint

The key to establish a relatively accurate active constraint pool is to obtain
an approximation of SCUC solution. We developed two approaches for achieving

this goal. The first is Commitment Initialization (CI) inspired by [57,58], and the
second is based on Integer Relaxation (IR). Procedures are shown in Fig. 3.2. Both

approaches solve an LP problem. The LP solution offers insight into the security

constraint relationship with the SCUC model. We used this information to establish

the lazy constraint pool. The basic idea was to find a much smaller active constraint
pool Jact, and the pool of lazy constraint is
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Figure 3.2: Data-Aided screening with Lazy Constraints. CI and IR provide a point
statistically close to the real solution. Security constraints with values below power
flow limits in certain extent are treated as lazy constraints, which reduce the size of
MILP and helps solve the problem faster if set properly.
3.4.2

Integer Relaxation

Relaxing integer variables in the SCUC model will yield an LP model, which
takes very little time to solve. The LP solution is by no means an accurate represen

tation of the MILP solution. However, it provides insights to where the solution may

point. We are solely interested in the net power injection from LP solution Pmj,r.
We established a boundary of net power injection,

∣l'''j'

and Pjnj,r, to accommodate

uncertainties resulting from the difference between LP and MILP solutions as shown
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in (3.33) and (3.34)

(3.33)
(3.34)

where β is the parameter to be tuned.
To set the lazy constraint, we take the following steps.

1. Build DAM SCUC (MILP) model
2. Apply the two-step screening method to obtain J2
3. Relax integer variables and solve LP problem, extract Γ,"β

4. Select β, calculate P™^ r,Pm,

r

r

5. Apply the two-step screening method on Γ'β'' r,Pβn, r, resulting in Jact
6. Obtain lazy constraint pool, Jlazy = J2∖Jact

3.4.3

Commitment Initialization

According to the persistence studies conducted with MISO cases, 90% of
previous day commitment was identical to the current day commitment. We exploited
this fact as a warm start to the SCUC model [57]. The basic idea was to get an
approximated power flow by solving an LP problem with initialized commitment.

The resulting power flow, fc, for each of the lines was often close to the true MILP
solution. Given power flow from LP solution fc, power flow limit F, and threshold

Y, if
(3.35)
holds, the security constraint for the line l is considered as potentially binding, which

is put to the active constraint set Jact. If equation (3.35) does not hold, this constraint
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for line l is set as lazy. We have Jlazy = J2∖Jact.

1. Build DAM SCUC (MILP) model
2. Apply the two-step screening method to obtain J2
3. Fix UCs with initial commitment, solve resulting LP problem

4. Calculate power flow, fc, based on LP solution
5. Choose threshold γ, use (3.35) to identify Jact
6. Obtain lazy constraint pool Jlazy = J2∖Jact
Security constraints are known to be a major cause of SCUC solution dete

rioration. SCUC solution quality cannot be guaranteed while including all watchlist
security constraints. In the combined approach of the two-step security constraint

screening and lazy constraint settings, MILP model optimization performance signif
icantly improves by having a smaller set of active constraints. Model integrity is also
maintained while having the potential optimal solution check against lazy constraints.

3.5

Experimental Results

In this chapter, we applied the proposed two-step security constraint screening
to a modified version of IEEE118-Bus test system. Dominating constraint detection
and computational performance are reported in this section. We also used MISO pro

vided real-world data to test the proposed offline-online security constraint screening
technique. Lazy constraints are set prior to solve SCUC based on IR and CI, dis

cussed in the previous chapter. SCUC performances amongst various techniques are
compared and analyzed.
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3.5.1

IEEE-118 Bus Test System Case Study

Test Setup
We applied the two-step screening method to IEEE-118 bus test system to

demonstrate the effectiveness of constraint reduction and solution efficiency for both

base case and line outage contingency case. To avoid confusion, scenario0 refers to a

set of pre-determined wind generation and load profiles. Scenario”- refers to the nth
scenario under study, where n ∈ [1,12]. Three wind farms are added to bus 36, 77, 69
with 24 hour power output. Wind power generation hourly profile and System wide

hourly load profile are shown in figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: Aggregated Load Profile (scenario0s are plotted with solid lines, and
scenario” s are in box plots for illustration)

Applying Offline and Online Method
Offline method, discussed in 3.2, is first applied to the scenario
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0

to screen

out the dominating constraints and obtaining dual variables. Load side uncertainty
is set as 10% about the load profile. Wind generator ratings were used to account
for wind generation variation. Secondly, net power injection interval can be derived

from (3.1) and (3.2) for scenario”-. Online method (theorem III.1) calculates power
flow upper bounds by utilizing dominating constraints, dual variables from offline
study and derived net power injection intervals of scenario”.

The online method

would consider constraints with upper bounds exceeding their respectable limits as
potentially dominating.

Lastly, for verification purpose, screening offline method

was applied directly to scenario” and truly dominating constraints were determined.
Results from offline method and online method were compared.

There are 8,928

network constraints per scenario (186 * 2 * 24). Contingency case accounts for N-1

line outage security constraints with the same approach. There is a total of 1,660,608
security constraints per scenario to be screened [(186 + 185 * 186) * 2 * 24].

Offline and Online Method Results
Security constraint screening results and performance summary is shown in

Table 3.1 and 3.2. Each row has the following attribute,
•

Offline: Base case (scenario0) screening results with offline method without

wind generation and load side uncertainty
•

Offlineffl: Base case (scenario0) screening results with offline method including
wind generation uncertainty and 10% load side uncertainty (obtaining dual
variables)

•

Online: Scenario

”

screening result using online method with materialized

uncertainty
•

Verify: Scenario ” screening result with offline method to verify online method
result (using the same input as Online)
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For the base case, in each time interval, there are 372 (186*2) network con

straints to be screened, without adding wind generation and load side uncertainty
(Offline).

Step 1 determines that 40 constraints are potentially dominating, and

Screening took

step 2 determines 18 out of 40 constraints are truly dominating.

0.0332 seconds. When uncertainties are introduced into the model (Offline+), the

screening process determines that 20 constraints are dominating. Wider net power
injection intervals cause 2 additional constraints to be dominating. Around 5% of the

constraints are determined to be truly dominating constraints after screening.
Similarly, the line outage contingency case contains 69,192 security constraints

per time interval. As shown in Table 3.1, 0.1% of the security constraints are truly

dominating (Offline), and once uncertainties are introduced to the model (Offline+),
dominating security constraint rate increases to 0.15%. Offline screening process takes
around 332 seconds per time interval. The significant time required for calculation
also bring motivation to implement online method.

Dual variables are obtained from screening scenario

0

during offline stage

with added uncertainty (Offline+). Online method is then applied to the scenario
The results are verified by applying an offline method to a scenario

n.

n

with realized

uncertainty (Verify). Dominating constraints determined by Online is a superset
Table 3.1: IEEE-118 Bus System Network/Security Constraint Screening Result

Method

1
2

Original1 Step11 Step21

Dom12

Dom22

Network
Constraint

Offline
Offline+
Online
Verify

372
372
20
372

40
51
32

18
20
16
15

10.79%
13.59%
8.63%

4.70%
5.45%
4.27%
4.10%

Security
Constraint

Offline
Offline+
Online
Verify

69192
69192
101
69192

6836
9643
6170

66
101
69
53

9.88%
13.94%
8.92%

0.10%
0.15%
0.10%
0.08%

Constraint count at each stage
Dominating constraint percentage after each screening step
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of Verify in both network and security constraint cases. It is due to the uncertainty

embedded in net power injection interval from scenario

0

completely covers the net

power injection interval for scenario”-. Hence, power flow upper bounds determined by
theorem III.1 will conservatively cover all potentially dominating security constraints

in a scenario

”.

In the base case, on a per time interval basis, the online method

determines that 16 out of 20 security constraints are dominating. Offline method

verifies that 15 out of 16 constraints are truly dominating. In the contingency case,

online method determines that 69 out of 101 security constraints are dominating.
Offline method verifies that 53 out of 69 constraints are truly dominating. We also

extended the study over a 24 hour planning period. The results are shown in 3.4.
The computational performance is shown in 3.2.

Since online method is

a numerical method, calculation time is remarkably short comparing with offline
method.

Particularly for contingency case, offline methods requires 5.43 minutes

(326 seconds for checking results) per time interval and online method only took 2.4

ms. Offline screening security constraints can be defined with uncertainty bounds
with proper preparation. Online method is capable of providing a truly remarkable
solution approach to remove redundant security constraints in large scaled systems.

The efficiency of the online method comes at the cost of storing dual variables.

The size to store dual variables is surprisingly small (manageable). Typically, 200 —
300 MBs. For the MISO HIPPO system, a day ahead market usually have 150 — 200
security constraints picked from watchlist. And usually around 50% of them could be
potentially binding. We can determine this by applying the proposed feasibility check
method after step 1. Let’s say that we need to store dual variables for 100 security

constraints per time interval over 36 intervals. The system contains 3000 buses. Total
dual variable number is (3000 * 2 + 99 + 1) * 100, where 3000 * 2 is the upper/lower
bound of net power injection interval, 99 is the constraints under the current LP, and

we need to calculate 100 LPs. This is a sparse matrix and depends on the precision
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of data type, i.e. float32. Memory that is required to store dual variables is small.

Figure 3.4: Offline-Online Screening Result (24 Hours)

Table 3.2: IEEE-118 Bus Test Case Network/Security Constraint Screening Perfor
mance Summary
Unit: Seconds
Offline
Offline+
Online
Verify

3.5.2

Network Constraint

Security Constraint

Step1

Step2

Total

Step1

Step2

Total

0.0168
0.0159
0.0072

0.0164
0.0247
0.0122

0.0332
0.0406
0.0006
0.0194

1.0889
1.1218
1.2101

330.8312
331.9979
324.6765

331.9200
333.1197
0.0024
325.8866

MISO Case Study
In section 3.5.1, we demonstrated the effectiveness of two-step security con

straint screening on IEEE-118 bus test system. In this section, we conduct numerical
simulations for MISO cases and analyze the performance impact of the proposed

method in MISO market-clearing optimization engine. By using historical data and
knowledge, such as Initial Commitment and uncertainty of net power injection, we
integrated the security constraint screening with lazy constraint in the optimization

model. The statistical approach helps tighten the net power injection range with a
given confidence interval, thus building a smaller watchlist with fewer security con
straints. Section 3.5.2 illustrates dominating constraints detection rate and perfor
40

mance of the two-step deterministic screening method. In Section 3.5.2, dominating

constraints detected by the two-step deterministic screening are enforced in the SCUC
model. Lazy constraints are applied based on the procedure discussed in 3.4. Numer
ical simulations are carried out on MISO HIPPO project engine [108], using Gurobi
7.5 in Centos with Intel Xeon E5@3.50GHz, 64 GB RAM [109].

Dominating Constraint Detection
We apply the two-step security constraints screening to MISO DAM SCUC

model prior to optimization. Dominating constraint detection rate and computation

time is shown in Table 3.3. Case 17 has the fastest processing time of 13.95 seconds
(step-1: 4.88s, step-2: 9.07s). 49% of the security constraints are dominating (original:
6604, step-1: 3451, step-2: 3152). In Case 1, screening time is 18.52 seconds (step-1:

6.03s, step-2: 12.49s), 43% of the security constraints are dominating (original: 9895,
step-1: 4806, step-2: 4251). Step-2 needs to screen 3451 constraints in Case 17 and

4806 constraints in Case 1, which is 40% increase in constraint count. Thus, the
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processing time for Step-2 is increased by 38% ( 499 79o7). The two-step method is

consistent across all cases, and processing time is linearly related to the number of
security constraints in the model. We applied the proposed method to over 80 MISO
DAM cases. Result shows that, 8075 security constraints are initially modeled on

average. It has been determined that 45% of the original constraints are dominating

(3634 = 8075 * 45%), which will remain in the model. 4421 redundant constraints are
safely removed from SCUC model prior to optimization. Average screening processing
time is 16.65 seconds by solving problem (C*) in step-2, comparing with 53.28 seconds
by solving problem (C).

Application of Security Constraint Screening to MISO SCUC
In the case study, MISO DAM SCUC optimization engine terminates if MILP
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Table 3.3: MISO Case Security Constraint Screening Result

Case#

1
2
3
4

5

Original1 Constr Cnt2 Dom%3 Time4

Easy

3
8
12
14

6948
9431
7454
6260

3602
4168
3221
3130

51.84%
44.19%
43.21%
50.00%

14.32
18.29
19.86
14.85

Hard

1
5
16
17
21
22

9895
6950
10400
6604
9540
8300

4251
3681
4198
3152
5186
4569

42.96%
52.96%
40.37%
47.73%
54.36%
55.05%

18.52
15.70
18.17
13.95
23.06
20.72

Average5

-

8075

3654

45.25%

16.65

Security constraint count in DAM SCUC model
Dominating constraint count after screening
Percentage of security constraint remained in the model
Screening time, step 2 solving (C*), in seconds
Average value over 80 cases

Gap reaches 0.1% or optimization time reaches 1200 seconds [34]. In this section, we

considered the case that has a base solution time longer than 1000 seconds as hard

case. Otherwise, it is considered as an easy case. The following solution approaches

are applied to the DAM SCUC model:
•

Base solution: Optimize DAM SCUC directly

•

Two-step solution: Screen security constraints in DAM SCUC model and
remove redundant constraints. To optimize the MILP model, no lazy constraint

settings are applied.
•

IR solution: Screening DAM SCUC model, remove redundant constraints.

Apply IR approach to set lazy constraints in MILP model; optimize. β is set
to 0.6.
•

CI solution: Screen DAM SCUC model and remove redundant constraints.

Apply CI Approach to set lazy constraints, then optimize. γ is set to 0.8.
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There are totally 46 cases where base solution time is over 300 seconds. Fig.

3.5 illustrates the SCUC optimization time comparison between base solution and

best of various screening solution approaches (two-step, IR, CI). With screening tech
niques, 63% of the cases (26/46) can be solved with 80% or less time than base case.

22% of the cases (10/46) are solved with 50% or less time.

Applications of CI

and IR approach are restricted by the availability of initial commitment and gener
ator dispatch statistics, tuning hyperparameter β and γ. Lazy constraint setting is

a heuristic approach to predicting binding constraints. The results show that good
lazy constraint pool could significantly improve the solution performance in terms of
solution time and quality.

Figure 3.5: MISO Case Optimization Time Comparison

Since easy cases take fewer than 1000 seconds to reach MILP gap below 0.1%,

we are mainly interested in solution time by aforementioned solution approaches. Re
sults are shown in Table 3.4. Screening in Case 8 improves SCUC solution time by

58 (298 - 240) seconds. CI Approach determines 3138 out of 4368 constraints are
lazy constraints, and at the end of optimization, 191 constraints are deemed to be

non-lazy and put back to the MILP model. CI Approach further decreased solution
time by 51 (240-189) seconds. With IR, more constraints are set as lazy, and results
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in more putting backs, which take a toll on the solution time, 209 seconds. On the
other hand, in Case 14, IR is able to achieve better solution time, 442 seconds, than
CI Approach, 520 seconds. The solution time resulting from the two lazy constraint

setting approaches are highly dependent on availability of initial commitment, and
hyperparameters β, γ.

Over-optimistic values can result in large number of con

straints being set as lazy, inaccurately. From our studies on MISO SCUC easy cases,
the two-step security screening method combined with lazy constraint settings shows
significantly reduction in SCUC solution time. On average, the aforementioned ap

proach saves an average of 292 seconds (30%) in SCUC optimization time compared
with base solution time.

Table 3.4: Easy Case SCUC Solution Summary

1
2
3
4

Case#

Approach

Time1

Gap2

3

Base
Two-step
CI
IR

680
622
456
469

0.08%
0.09%
0.10%
0.10%

0
0
2952
3939

0
0
191
860

8

Base
Two-step
CI
IR

298
240
189
209

0.08%
0.08%
0.08%
0.10%

0
0
3138
4137

0
0
191
1069

14

Base
Two-step
CI
IR

831
648
520
442

0.07%
0.09%
0.09%
0.10%

0
0
2419
3062

0
0
410
806

Lz_ct3 Lz_pb4

SCUC optimization time, unit in seconds
SCUC MILP gap (%)
lazy constraint count in MILP model
lazy constraint put back count after solving MILP

Hard cases take longer than 1000 seconds to reach MILP gap of 0.1%. Results
are shown in Table 3.5. Incorporating screening methods helps many cases to reach
0.1% MILP gap under 1200 seconds, whereas previously they could not. In Case 17,

the base solution could not reach 0.1% MILP gap within 1200 seconds, hence, the
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optimization process is terminated, and the resulting MILP gap is 0.11%. The two-

step approach allows MILP gap to reach 0.1% at 1188 seconds. The CI approach is
able to reach MILP gap 0.09% at 1063 seconds. Screening dramatically reduce MILP
solution time in some hard cases. In Case 1, the two-step approach decreases SCUC

optimization time by 126 seconds from base case solution. CI and IR are able to reach
0.1% MILP GAP in 270 seconds. Total solution time is reduced by 777 seconds.
Table 3.5: Hard Case SCUC Solution Summary

1
2
3
4

Case#

Approach

Time1

Gap2

1

Base
Two-step
CI
IR

1047
921
271
270

0.07%
0.06%
0.10%
0.09%

0
0
1592
3203

0
0
10
1042

5

Base
Two-step
CI
IR

1103
658
899
802

0.10%
0.07%
0.09%
0.09%

0
0
2366
3409

0
0
166
1170

1177

Base
Two-step
CI
IR

1200
1188
1063
1200

0.11%
0.10%
0.09%
0.08%

0
0
1458
2087

0
0
64
429

91
21

Base
Two-step
CI
IR

1200
1200
1200
1201

0.26%
0.19%
0.10%
0.16%

0
0
3549
5110

0
0
8
1752

99
22

Base
Two-step
CI
IR

1200
993
872
669

0.23%
0.09%
0.09%
0.09%

0
0
2742
4557

0
0
11
1504

Lz_ct3 Lz_pb4

SCUC optimization time, unit in seconds
SCUC MILP gap (%)
lazy constraint count in MILP model
lazy constraint put back count after solving MILP

Case 1 and 22 simulation results in Fig. 3.6 illustrate two typical performance

improvements when screening is applied. As shown in Fig. 3.6(a), the optimization
engine can get the solution within 1200 seconds. When IR or CI based screening
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is employed, it only takes about 25% of the original time to find the solution with
similar optimal gap. In contrast, Fig. 3.6(b) shows how screening could improve the

performance when the original model could not be solved within 1200 seconds. It is

observed that all two-step, IR, and CI based screening help the optimization engine

solve the problem within time limit.

Figure 3.6: Optimization Time Comparison. Figure (a) presents the result for Case
1 where optimal gap is reached within time limit without screening. Figure (b)
presents results for Case 22 where optimal gap is not reached within time limit without
screening

In a few hard cases, the solver could not get a solution with required gap even

if the proposed methods were applied. For instance, Case 21 in Fig. 3.7(a) shows
the solver terminates after 1200 seconds. According to Fig. 3.7(b), screening helps
reduce the gap significantly. IR based approach decreases the gap to 0.16% from

0.26% while CI approach almost get to 0.1% gap.
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Figure 3.7: Gap Comparison. Optimal gap cannot be reached with or without screen
ing. Figure (b) shows the gap differences when screening is applied.

47

CHAPTER IV
PRICE CONSTRAINTS

Some security constraints are not modelled in DAM, but they are binding in the

RTM, which results in severe financial losses and inefficient dispatch. We proposed
that DAM SCUC solution should account for deviations to anticipate this diver

gence, subject to generator dispatch deviation, load forecasting error, virtual bid and

offer cleared MW. The congestion forecasting tool implements price constraints after
MTLF (Midterm Load Forecasting) and before DAM SCUC to identify a potentially

binding security constraint set.

As the 24 hours ahead information indicates, the DAM SCUC solution is a
fixed solution. As uncertainty materialize and new and more accurate information
becomes available, the real time optimal solution can possibly deviate from the DAM

SCUC solution. This deviation can be possibly captured by enforcing price constraints
on the participating elements, i.e. generator dispatch, virtual bid/offer fixed demand

and price sensitive demand.

This can be set as a percent of allowable deviation

from SCUC solution. E.g. MISO allows 7% of generation dispatch deviation due to

ramping limits and inaccurate voltage measurements. However, if the plant does not
follow the dispatch signal and deviates more than the limit, it is going to be penalized

severely.
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(4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3)
(4.4)

Generator and virtual are broken into piece-wise MW segments based on
individual bidding curves.

(4.5)
(4.6)
(4.7)
(4.8)

We would consider that the generation and demand has a deviation allowance,

δp and δd. The deviation can cut off more expensive segments on generators. We can
reformulate (4.1) and (4.2); the asset deviation is shown as follows:

(4.9)

(4.10)

Virtual deviation is closely related to the generator deviation.

Generator

deviation will affect the marginal unit’s cleared mw and associated cleared nodal price

(the most expensive segment of the marginal unit’s bidding curve). If we quantify
generator deviation in terms of bidding price, the marginal unit (generator)’s price
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variation will also create a price range for the virtual bid/offer on the same node,

which corresponds to a virtual power injection range.

(4.11)
(4.12)

Modify problem (C) formulation as problem (D). Generator and Virtual de

viation penalty factor, γp and γv, are added to the new objective function. γ is a
very small constant, which scales down generator/virtual cost function proportionally.

The added terms in the objective of problem (D) should resemble a SCED problem,
which minimize cost of generator and virtual while maintaining power balance and
enforcing security constraints.

(4.13)

(4.14)
(4.15)
(4.16)

(4.17)
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(4.18)
(4.19)
(4.20)
(4.21)
(4.22)

The cost of asset deviation can be derived from solution of problem (D) by
solving (4.23). If the cost is too much, we can form a system-wide cut and add back
to problem (D), where β is between 0 and 1, representing a allowance of deviation in
terms of SCUC overall cost. (4.24) is the price constraint (budget of uncertainty).

(4.23)
(4.24)

SCUC objective value is not a representation of individual line congestion

status. Instead, we can form cuts on each constraint by accessing SCUC solution to

calculate “power flow cost”. We considered that the cost are from 4 different kinds
of assets, generators, virtual inc (behaves like generators), virtual dec (behaves like

price sensitive load) and price sensitive load. Each of these assets can be constrained
by an hourly cost, specifically, shown in the following equations. The summation of

the specified hourly costs is the hourly SCUC cost. It does not account for transition

cost, reserve cost etc. Basically, we only account for the active (hourly) units and its
respective cost. For line l, the cost of power flow is shown as follows,
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(4.25)
(4.26)
(4.27)
(4.28)

While solving problem (D) iteratively, cost of power subject to asset deviation is,

(4.29)
(4.30)
(4.31)
(4.32)

As generator and virtual inc behave similarly in the optimization model, so

do price sensitive load and virtual dec. What if we form the following constraints?

(4.33)
(4.34)
(4.35)
(4.36)

We can first solve problem (C) with feasibility check method, same as two-
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step offline prescreening method and can obtain the dominating security constraints
(potentially binding, J2). Then, we can formulate problem (D), and add price con

straints. Identify constraint set J3, where J3 ⊆ J2 ⊆ U
Thing needs to be addressed are:
1. Asset deviation needs a creditable range, δp and δd

2. Virtual and price sensitive demands are unrestricted from SCUC solution in
problem (D), virtual is causing MAJOR cost deviation

3. price deviation (4.24), δc, could be a fixed number or a vector correlated to how
far away from the power flow limit

4. Complete topology, sensitivity factor, asset location, creditable security con
straint set

5. AC/DC error and loop flow
What if we are only interested in the absolute change of dispatches, or we can

only account for the generator/virtual that increased in value?

(4.37)
(4.38)
(4.39)

4.1

Price Constraint with LMP confidence Interval
If the set of potentially binding constraints is very large and the cost of asset

deviation is too much that it is impossible to happen in real world application, we
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can define a cut to further restrict the power injection interval thus, obtaining more
creditable potentially binding constraints (shrunk).
The cost cut essentially modify generator’s bidding curve. The use of Lo

cational Marginal Price (LMP) confident interval may result in an infeasible model
due to insufficient generation capacity. Determine the 95% confident interval of LMP

at each generator/virtual node. To form a price to quantity relationship, denote as
function Πm(∙). This function has to subject to hour of the day, season of the year,

load level and other factors. We want this function to be dynamic.

(4.40)

Modify problem (D) constraint (4.16) and (4.19) with (4.41). We are elimi

nating the more expensive segments that are outside the price confident interval. If
we are using 95% CI,we (4.41) will cover up to 97.5% of the price points.

(4.41)

(4.42)

Solve problem (D), identify potentially binding constraint, calculate deviation

cost with (4.23). We have conducted tests with MISO DAM data and the result is
shown in table 6.1. The price constraint method can remove up to an additional

10% of the constraints following step 2. 95% price constraint confidence interval is
used in the calculation, i.e. price quantity pairs below 2.25% and above 97.5% were

removed. However, the downside of this approach is the time consumption. Price

constraint algorithm took around 10 minutes for a 9500 branch, 3000 bus system
with 800 contingencies, where step 2 only took 3 minutes.
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4.2

Virtual Confidence Interval
Virtual bid/offer accounts for about 45% of DAM capacity, and capacity and are

intended to breach the gap between DAM and RTM. Virtuals are removed during
real-time operation. We developed a way to use a virtual confidence interval to fur
ther shrink the net power injections that are considered in DAM. Table 4.1 shows the
security constraints screening test results by removing the virtuals from the system.

It mimics real time operation. ’’With Virtual” column is the typical DAM security

constraint count, and ’Without Virtual” column removes available virtual partici
pants from the DAM clearing model. The security constraint screening technique

is consistent with previous discussion. It is important to point out that ”Without

Virtual” column contains only 171 dominating security constraints in 36 planning
periods while the entire DAM model contains 3161 dominating security constraints.

It is roughly 18.5 times the computational burden during SCUC optimization.

Table 4.1: Security Constraint Screening Without Virtual
With Virtual

Without Virtual

Offline

4231

2227

Online

3296

818

Verify

3161

171

LMP on price nodes can vary significantly due to the bidding behaviors of
traditional generation units and virtual players. LMPs are not available before solv

ing DAM SCED. However, we can determine a confidence interval of the LMP by

investigating numerous historical DAM cases. Since virtual bids/offers come in finer
piecewise segments, they can better represent the DAM node pricing. As illustrated

in Figure 4, we first obtained the virtual LMP confidence interval by sampling from
historical nodal pricing data. The upper and lower bound of pricing will correspond

to an MW quantity that can be cleared. The red segment in the bid curve is the

remaining MW that should be considered in security constraint filtering. The blue
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segment on the virtual offer curve is the remaining MW. Overall, reducing the partic
ipating virtual quantity, will result in reduced number of potentially binding security

constraints.
There are two possible ways of implementing the virtual confidence interval
information. Firstly, it is for watchlist security constraint screening. It is advised

to combine this approach with lazy constraint setting when going into DAM SCUC,
because the potential inaccuracy caused by statistical method can be addressed by

setting the less likely binding constraints to dormant during optimization. Secondly,
it can be used during SFT process, where the price signal can artificially create a

power injection interval.

Figure 4.1: Using Virtual Confidence Interval to Reduce Net Power Injection. The
red staircase bidding curve shows a typical virtual bid price quantity pair. The blue
descending staircase offer curve shows a typical virtual offer price quantity pair. The
cleared price confidence interval on the y-axis would cut off excessive amount of MW
quantity marked on the x-axis.

One would ask of what the typical price ranges of the virtual transactions
are. It is a very hard to answer. Mainly due to the nature of virtual transactions.

Virtual participants are risk-takers. They make money by exploiting the divergence

between DAM and RTM. To capture the price gap, virtual participants may bid op
portunistically or conservatively depending on hour of the day, season, temperature,
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and partial topology information. In other words, the virtual bids/offers differs dras

tically by node (bus) and time of the day. Virtual transactions accounts for over 45%
of total cleared bids/offer in the DAM model. Virtual transaction’s range is much

wider than generation bids. For example, on a node with generating unit, the genera

tor piece-wise bids can be ranging from 20-60, but virtual transaction may be around
0 to 200. Similar phenomena also exist for nodes with large sum of loads. Something

interesting to point out is that depending on the type of physical asset present on a

node, the bidding/offer behavior/strategy changes drastically. However, we are not
allowed to discuss this information in the paper due to the fact it may expose certain

business tactic/secrets.

As how virtuals are aggregated on individual nodes, as presented in the paper,
we use the topology information, i.e. linear sensitivity factor matrix, to determine

which bids are on which nodes. If node A shares the same sensitivity factor with
node B with respect to all security constraints, then the bids/offers on node A and

B can be aggregated. We would sort bids from node A and B in ascending order and
offers in descending order. The aggregation needs to be done for each planned period

individually, since topology change may occur.
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CHAPTER V
STATIC ANALYSIS OF GENERATION AND LOAD DEVIATION

POST DISPATCH

5.1

Generator Deviation and Load Side Uncertainty
Real-time dispatch and topologies vary from day-ahead market. This section

discusses the divergence caused by generation deviation and load side uncertainty.

The two-step security constraint screening method allows us to estimate the power
flow bounds given to a system topology and resource information, i.e. generation
limit, load forecast and contingencies. If the input is a range of generator dispatch and

potential load deviation, we would be able to obtain the range of power flow in extreme

conditions. The following equation serves as a power injection deviation index, where

Pmnj* is the dispatch solution of DAM SCUC. ∕j''' in (5.1) is the power injection
deviation metric we used to analyze the possible deviation resulted by utilizing offline
method to calculate the upper and lower bounds of the power flow online l. Deviation

Analysis contains the following studies,
• Mapping function of generator deviation and load uncertainty to power injection

bounds
• Mapping function of power injection bounds to power flow bounds
• Potential binding constraint occurrence under credible contingencies and sever

ity
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(5.1)

The following figure shows power injection deviation as a function of generator
deviation.

Typically, generator deviation is between 3% 7%, and power injection

deviation is in linear relationship with generator deviation in this region. We applied

generation deviation with full range just as illustration. However, generator deviation
is restricted by ramp rates and capacity. When uncertainty increase beyond 10%,

there simply will not be enough resource to follow up.

Figure 5.1: Power Injection Deviation as a Function of Generation Deviation. Note
that typical generator deviation is within 7%, and power injection is linearly direct
proportional to generation deviation.

Load deviation is caused by inaccuracy of load forecasting. Typically, load

side uncertainty is within 10%. The following graph shows power injection deviation

as a function of generator and load deviation. In the relatively small deviation region,
input and output correlation is almost linear. The nonlinear relationship happens at
higher input deviation percentage and is caused by lack of generation resources and

load going over its limit. For example, when generator deviation is up to 17.5% and
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load deviation is 10%, the nodal power injection deviation is around 16%. The linear

regression tries to capture this relationship.

Figure 5.2: Power Flow Bounds as a Function of Generator Deviation and Load
Deviation. Note that generation and load deviation have been discretized to create a
finite number of pairs of uncertainties.

A simple linear regression function is used to approximate the observation that
generator and load deviation post SCUC dispatch is almost linearly proportional to

the nodal power injections. (5.2) shows the relationship. Note that, MSE = 0, r2 = 1,
it is almost a perfect linear approximation.

(5.2)

We explore the relationship between power injection deviation and load side

uncertainty. The wind generation in MISO territory is not as potent as traditional

generation sources. Table 5.1 illustrates the analysis results. ’’load” in the first column
is the uncertainty bound that can be experienced in the system, i.e. up to 20% load
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increase. However, in reality, load rarely go above 7% of the forecast value. In extreme

situations, such as snow storm or heat wave, the value could deviate tremendously,

but it is not our focus in this study. ’’Wind” column is the wind energy uncertainty
bound, and we assume it can go up to 20% above the forecast value. When load and

wind generation have a new bound, we can calculate the power injection deviation
using (5.1), reflected in column ’Power Injection”. Solve problem (c) will yield a new

power flow bounds based on input uncertainties.

Table 5.1: Power Injection Deviation Affected by Load and Wind Generation
Load1 Wind2 Power Injection3
5%
0%
4.97 %
10 %
0%
9.94 %
20 %
0%
19.88 %
0%
10 %
0.34 %
0% 20 %
0.68 %
5%
10 %
5.31 %
10 %
10 %
10.28 %
10 % 20 %
10.62 %
20 %
10 %
20.22 %
20 % 20 %
20.56 %
1
2
3

System wide load deviation
System wide Wind deviation
Power injection deviation

From table 5.1, it is easy to observe that power injection is greatly affected by

load deviation, and wind generation uncertainty have little effect. When system-wide
load is increased by 20%, power injection deviation is increased by 19.88%. If the
system only experience 20% wind generation increase, power injection only varies by

0.68%. In the most extreme situation, where both load and wind generation is 20%
above the forecast value, system-wide power injection increases by 20.56%.

In the next step, we attempted to create a mapping function between the

power injection deviation to the power flow bounds. The following equation (5.3)
serves as an indicator of power flow variation. f * is the SCUC power flow solution,
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Fι is the power flow limit and flδ is the power flow deviation.

(5.3)

The following histogram shows the distribution of power flow deviation on
all security constraints modeled in base case when fixing generator deviation to 7%,

with mean of 3.65% and standard deviation of 5.44%. 95% of power flow deviation

is within 12.25% of the SCUC power flow solution.

Figure 5.3: Power Flow Deviation Associated with 7% Generation Deviation. Devi
ations are Compiled into a Histogram for illustration purpose

When treating generator deviation as a variable, and solve power flow bounds
with the two-step methods, we can generate the following graph. The relationship

between generator/load deviation and power flow deviation is relatively linear at low
percentage level and exponentially decaying at high percentage level. However, gen

erator deviation above 10% is not realistic. The following figure also shows that the

power flow bounds deviation is heavily skewed to the lower loading level. Standard
deviation cannot accurately capture the behavior. We used Medium Absolute Devi
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ation (MAD) to capture the trend. MAD is a robust measure of the variability of a

univariate sample of quantitative data.

Figure 5.4: Power Flow Deviation Distribution Associated with Various Generation
Deviation. Note that the assumption is generation deviation is below 7%, and the
respective power flow bounds deviation is relatively linear and heavily distributed
under 10%.

The following plot is security constraints sorted in descending order based
on occurrence of violations. Generator deviation is set to below 20% and load devi

ation is below 10%. There are 36 intervals in each DAM SCUC case, we simulated

power injection pretending to be the real time dispatch value. The simulated value
is bounded by the uncertainty region discussed previously. Not all constraints are
present in each interval, therefore, technically the maximum occurrence of a con

straint is 7200 = 36 × 100 × 2 (# of intervals × # of cases × # of directions). If the
simulated power injection produces a power flow upper bound that is higher than its

power flow limit, we will consider it as potentially binding in real time. The findings
from the static analysis shows,

63

Figure 5.5: Potential Binding Security Constraints Sorted by Violation Count.

1. Generation/Load deviation is almost linearly direct proportional to power in
jection deviation
2. At 7% generation deviation, 5% of security constraints have the potential of

becoming binding in RTM, that is approximately 9.1 constraints per interval
3. With up to 7% generation deviation, the power transfer on existing binding
security constraint would increase 10%, with standard deviation of 0.026. The

95% percentile is 0.39. In other words, the power transfer would up to 39% in
95% of the situations.

4. With up to 20% generation deviation and 10% demand deviation, potentially
binding security constraint would experience up to 6.5% increase with standard
deviation of 2.6% and, the 95th percentile is 10.9%.

5. Figure 5.5 shows the potential binding security constraints sorted by violation
counts, potentially binding constraints occurrence under power injection devia
tion.
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5.2

Deviation and Security Constraint Screening Analysis on RTS96 Sys

tem
The application of security constraint offline-online screening is applied to RTS96
test case [110]. Test result is compared with IEEE-118 Bus test case. It is shown that

the proposed method is consistent in terms of dominating constraint detection and
computational performance. RTS96 test case consists of 120 transmission lines, 73
buses, 158 generators, and 51 loads. Day-ahead market load data is given for every

hour over 366 days. And the real-time market load data is given for every 5 minutes
intervals. In this experiment, we first apply the offline method to one specific period to

determine the dominating security constraints (N-1 contingency) and dual variables,
then use the updated real-time data (5 minutes interval, 12 data sets for the specific

hour) to determine the power flow upper bound. Lastly, apply the offline method to
the 12 sets of real-time data to determine the true dominating constraints and power
flow upper bounds. We present dominating constraint detection and computation
performance with the proposed framework.
Data analytics were performed on load variation between day-ahead market

and real-time market. Since real-time data is in 5 minutes intervals and day-ahead

data is in 1-hour intervals, we would take the hourly average value of real-time data
to compare with day-ahead data. We would like to understand the load deviation

between the two data sets. The deviation is expressed as [(Real-time MW - Day-

ahead MW)/Day-ahead MW] as the statistic shown in the following figure. The 95%
percentile is between -11.6% and 4%. We assumed 10% load side deviation in the
experiment onward. (This also justifies the 10% load side uncertainty assumption

that’s been made previously). The histogram of load deviation between real-time
and day ahead forecast is shown in figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: RTS96 Real-Time Load Deviation from DA Load Forecast

Table.

5.2 shows the performance of proposed offline-online security con

straints method on RTS-GMLC system and IEEE-118 bus system. In Offline Screen
ing stage, step-1 finds 20% of the security constraints potentially binding in RTS-

GMLC system and 15% in IEEE-118 bus system.

The computation time is 0.18

seconds and 1.12 seconds, respectively. Step-2 solves 5,685 LPs and further deter

mines only 106 are dominating constraint, which accounts for 0.37% (=106/28,800)
of N-1 security constraints in RTS-GMLC system. For IEEE-118 bus system, the

dominating constraints rate is 0.15%. The LP calculations took 165 and 332 seconds,

respectively. Note that we applied the modified step 2 method feasibility check, i.e.
problem (C*). On RTS-GMLC system, the feasibility check performed on 5685 con

straints is 165.12 seconds; 106 constraints have the potential of becoming dominating,
perform LP calculation 106 times takes 0.338 seconds. However, if we solve the LP
directly 5685 times, it would take 1035.03 seconds. It is observed that the significant

computation burden of step-2, even for a relatively small size system, calls for a more
efficient method of real-time security constraint monitoring.

Online Screening is then applied with real-time net power injection. Online
method is based on the closed-form equation (3.26).

It takes 2.5 ms and 2.4 ms

to finish the calculation on RTS-GMLC system and IEEE-118 bus system, respec
tively. Compared with 165 and 332 seconds for offline screening, the online version

shows significant advantage in processing time. When the uncertainty is material
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ized, the online screening finds that 99 out of 106 security constraints are potentially

dominating in RTS-GMLC, and 69 out of 101 in IEEE-118 bus system. Apply Veri

fication to same data set used in Online Screening, 91 out of 99 constraints are truly
dominating in RTS-GMLC system, and 53 out of 69 in IEEE-118 bus system. It

shows that the online component has relatively accurate predication of the dominat
ing constraints.The comparison between the two medium size test system shows that

the proposed method is consistent in terms of dominating constraint detection and
computational performance.

Table 5.2: RTS-GMLC/IEEE-118 bus System Security Constraint Screening Results
Time (Seconds)

Dominating Constraint Detection

Test Case
Originall1
Step-12
Step-23
Online4
Verification5
1
2
3
4

5

5.3

RTS-GMLC

IEEE118

RTS-GMLC

IEEE118

28,800
5,685
106
99
91

69,492
9,643
101
69
53

0.18
165
0.0025
147

1.12
332
0.0024
326

N-1 security constraints modeled
Apply step-1 to the test system
Apply step-2 offline screening including uncertainty
Apply step-2 online screening with real-time data
Verify the results by applying step-2 offline method with real-time data

Post DAM SCUC Power Injection Sampling
We sampled power injections with DAM SCUC solution as the set point, and

ramp rate/standard deviation as uncertainty margin. This study aims to answer the
questions that how power flow bounds would vary given the credible power injection

bounds.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the idea of sampling power injection after DAM SCUC
and before SFT. The red bar in the figure is the optimal solution from SCUC (power

injection on bus m, for all buses). Theoretically, generation units must follow MISO
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order, i.e. SCUC solution. However, there are situations where the generation unit
operations are delayed. We call the difference between SCUC power injection and
actual generator dispatch as “gap” or “generator deviation”. And to quantify the
gap, as shown below, we assumed that the gap has to be smaller than the actual ramp

rate or two standard deviation around the mean, i.e. expected value (SCUC dispatch
value).

The distance between the two black bars is the absolute gap (generator

deviation). Any point sampled between the upper bound and the expected value,
we call it the sampled power flow upper bound, and any point sampled between the

expected value and the absolute power injection lower bound is the sampled lower
bound. The two-sampling distribution we used in the following studies are uniform

distribution and normal distribution.

To emphasize the goal of sampling, we outlined the uncertainty bound of
power flow given as a set point and a range of power injection deviation (from the

set point). Figure 5.8 illustrates the idea. The blue star is the SCUC solution, if
we can clearly define the uncertainty region, i.e. ramp rate, standard deviation. We

can picture that the deviated optimal solution will reside in the uncertainty region
(shaded area). Red star is the new optimal solution after deviation. Power injections
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sampled from the shaded region will yield individual power flow bounds. And it may
resemble what happens in real time.

DAM SCUC Feasible Solution Set

Figure 5.8: DAM SCUC Solution Set Variations

Figure 5.9 shows the sampling results. With set point being SCUC solution,

power injection interval constrained by either ramp rate or two standard deviation

and sampling distribution using uniform or normal, we can make the following obser

vations.
The branch under study (branch index 6296) has power flow limit of 212 MW.
1st figure is the power flow upper bound distribution using ramping constraint and

uniform distribution. All power flow upper bounds are under the limit (indicated by

the red vertical line). 2nd figure is the power flow upper bound distribution using
generator standard deviation as constraint and uniform distribution. The majority

of power flow upper bound distribution is over power flow limit. This may be an
indicator that the line can be over limit. And the 3rd figure uses generator standard
deviation as constraint and normal distribution. And all power flow upper bounds

are under limit.

The question becomes which assumption is most realistic. Future study is

required to understand the relationship between sampling distribution and constraint
that is associated with the gap between DAM and RT market. The study should be

done on a per branch basis.
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Figure 5.9: Post SCUC Power Injection Sampling and Power Flow Bounds Variation

5.4

Impact Index
In the previous sections, we discussed the power flow deviations based on power

injection deviations and constraint violations given creditable contingencies. Note
that the assumption is a fixed optimal solution resulted from SCUC calculation.
Two important metrics derived from the analysis are the severity of violation and

how frequent the violations are. We proposed to combine both metrics to form the
Impact Index, where a single metric that can help the system operator to pick the

security constraint that may exert the most stress in the system. f∣μ is the average
of sampled power flow for line l for all the contingency power flows, Fl∕Fl is the

upper/lower limit of line l. n is the sample size, n = # sample/ctg × # ctg. The
Severity of the power flow violation online l can be defined as (5.4). Violation

Frequency is defined as (5.5). The Impact Index is defined as (5.6).
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(5.4)

(5.5)

(5.6)

We use the following data from MISO DAM to demonstrate the potency and

effectiveness of impact index ranking. Table 5.3 lists the max power flow calculated

from (5.4), power flow limits and severity for 5 security constraints. The name of the

branches are omitted due to nondisclosure agreement.
Table 5.3: Power Flow Violation Severity Calculation
Line #

1
2
3
4
5

Max Flow (MW)

Flow Limit (MW)

150
225
60
175
525

115
185
50
100
500

Severity (%)

1.30
1.22
1.20
1.75
1.05

Table 5.4 displays the frequency of violations, i.e. power flow over limit. For
example, total creditable contingency count is 805, meaning there are 805 various

topology changes. Line 1 is only present in 100 contingencies, and the power flow on
this line violates its power flow limit by 10 times, resulting in 10% occurrence, shown

in the ’’Frequency” column. The calculation follows (5.5).

Next, we can calculate the impact index following (5.6) and the resulting

impact index is shown in 5.5. Line index is sorted based on impact index in descending
order, as shown in table 5.6. Line 4 has the highest impact index of 1.58, due to having

high severity (1.75) and violation frequency (90%). System operator should consider
to include constraints with the highest impact index.
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Table 5.4: Power Flow Violation Frequency Calculation
Line #

Violation Count

Total Scenario (MW)

10
75
15
18
45

100
150
250
20
300

1
2
3
4
5

Frequency (%)

0.10
0.50
0.06
0.90
0.15

Table 5.5: Power Flow Violation Impact Index Calculation
Line #

1
2
3
4
5

Severity

Frequency (%)

1.30
1.22
1.20
1.75
1.05

0.10
0.50
0.06
0.90
0.15

Impact
0.13
0.61
0.07
1.58
0.16

We plotted the impact index of the security constraints in descending order

for the MISO DAM case in figure 5.10. The X-axis is the branch ranking, the real

branch/constraint name is omitted for simplicity. The Left Y-axis shows the violation

frequency and right Y-axis shows the severity scale. Impact index is marked in red.

This figure provided the system operators an visual aid that offline studies can pick

out the security constraints that has the highest risk of increase system stress. The

right vertical line is a 20 constraint cut off. It shows that if only 20 constraints can
be included for future evaluation, the indices of the constraints are presented by the

impact index list. The system operator can also set an impact index threshold, the
cutoff will base on the interpretation of severity and violation frequency. The latter
requires correlation study between impact index and real-time constraint violation.
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Table 5.6: Impact Index Sorted from Highest to Lowest
Line #

4
2
5
1
3

Severity

Frequency (%)

1.75
1.22
1.05
1.30
1.20

0.90
0.50
0.15
0.10
0.06

Impact

1.58
0.61
0.16
0.13
0.07

Figure 5.10: Impact Index Plotted in Descending Order
Figure 5.11 shows the distribution of the impact factors of the 9498 security
constraints considered in SFT. The x-axis is the impact factor in ascending order,

the higher the placement, the more stress a particular group of constraints can create

stress in the system. The y-axis is the security constraint counts. It is obvious that
the majority of the branches are safe from over loading. We estimated that only

8.27% (786/9498) violated the security constraint screening with uncertainties. The
size of the watch list pool is 786, and it still seems large to be considered entirely in

the SFT interactions with SCUC. We can follow the previous step by only picking
the security constraints with the highest impact index to relax the energy dispatching

protocol.
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Branch Count Counts

Figure 5.11: Impact Index Distribution
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CHAPTER VI
CONTINGENCY SCREENING

The contingency screening procedure is an enhanced SFT module that applies
the previous mentioned approach to the DAM SCUC solution (power injection) and

credible contingencies to create a pool of security constraints that could be binding
in real time.
Traditionally, SFT module takes the solution of DAM SCUC and apply the

optimal dispatch and commitment to a set of credible contingencies. It is usually
one stop solution to determine the DC power flows, and they are checked against

respective power flow limits. Any violation would result in the constraint being put
back into the SCUC module and solved again.

The enhanced module will take the DAM SCUC solution, add uncertainties
to create power injection interval. Then use the power injection interval to determine

the power flow bounds.

Therefore, any possible deviation within the uncertainty

assumption would be mapped into a set of power flow bounds solutions. Figure 6.1

shows the workflow. The module does the following,
• Create power injection uncertainty bounds from SCUC base case solution
• Determines potential binding security constraints with DAM SCUC as a set

point
• Introduce price constraint
• Rank constraints with associated impact index
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Figure 6.1: Enhanced SFT Module

The power flow upper/lower bounds are calculated using the security con

straint screen in step 2. 6.2 illustrated the relationship between bounds and their
respective power flow limits. the solid dots represent the power flow bounds calcu
lated from all creditable contingencies, and the smooth lines represents the power flow

limits. If the dots are bounded by the smooth lines, these constraints are redundant,
and they can be safely removed from the module. When the dots are outside the

bounds, we need to consider adding these constraints back to the SCUC model, since
they are dominating constraints that create violations if the contingency is realized
in real time.
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Figure 6.2: Power Flow Bounds in SFT
We use MISO DAM data to demonstrate the effectiveness of enhanced SFT

calculation. For a particular day, in a given period, the system contains 9498 security
constraints, 805 creditable contingencies, and both directions of power flow have to

be considered. Total constraints under evaluation is 15, 291, 780 = 9498 * 805 * 2.
First step should be to enumerate all the security constraints, then apply step 1, the

numerical method, to determine potentially binding constraints. However, we realized
it would take an extraordinary amount of time and space from our experiment. We

developed a modified step 1 method to save resource, it contains three steps.
1. Step 0 Coarse: Determine the rough estimate (MW) of the maximum power flow
for all constraints. Γz+m∕Γ-m denote the sensitivity factor that is greater/less

than zero for a line l at bus m. P™+∕Pm~ denote the power injection up-

per/lower bound that is greater/less than zero at bus m. If (6.1) or (6.2) is

true, it means that under rough estimate conditions, i.e. not accounting for
minor difference, the constraint can be violated in the forward flow direction.

If (6.3) or (6.4) is true, it means that under rough estimate conditions, the

constraint can be violated in the reverse flow direction. The constraint under
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study will be marked for further screening and redundant constraints can be

safely removed.

(6.1)
(6.2)
(6.3)
(6.4)

2. Step 0 Stacking: Stack the results of step 0 coarse into a three-dimensional

matrix. When we enumerate all the security constraints from the creditable

contingency, the sensitivity factor matrix was [L × M]. After including con
tingency dimension, the new matrix size becomes [L × M × C], where C is the
contingency set.
3. Step 0 Unique: Determine the unique security constraint based on [L × M]
across the [C] dimension. In plain words, we are trying to categorize contin
gencies. Line outage contingencies would usually impact only a small part of

the sensitivity matrix. This is mainly done by utilizing the ”numpy.unique”
function by Python. Another way to determine whether the difference amongst
topologies is by setting a tolerance level, θ, as shown in (6.5). ∆ΓCm is the dif
ference amongst sensitivity factors among various contingencies. Since, we only

have either the upper or lower bound of the injection at bus m, the maximum

positive value will yield the highest disturbance when multiplied by the absolute
sensitivity factor difference. θ can be either a hard set value, i.e. 5 MW, or as

a fraction of the power flow limit, i.e. 5 MW = 5% * 100 MW, where Fl = 100

MW. The physical interpretation is that the variation amongst topologies can
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be ignored if the power flow disturbance is under threshold, θ.

(6.5)

Table 6.1 shows the enhanced SFT test result. Step 0 Coarse scanning filtered
243,848 out of 15,291,780 constraints can be binding. This process took 28 minutes
and cost 6.3 GB of memory space.

The stacking process took 116 seconds, but

reduced the memory usage to 210 bytes. This is due to the use of sparse matrix. we

could not do this in the previous step, because each contingency has to be generated
individually. Step 0 Unique reduce the constraints by another half, 130,740 constraints
remains in the pool. Lastly, we run the two-step security constraint screening method,

only 177 constraints have the potential to become binding, reduced from the original
15 million constraints!

The goal of enhanced SFT is to use the power flow bounds to create an uncer
tainty bounds for power flows amongst various topology, i.e. creditable contingencies.
Traditional SFT using a simple one-step calculation on a fixed point, the SCUC power

injection, is not robust against uncertainties. Any deviation that is not ’’discretized”
is considered and may cause unexpected operating conditions in the system where

enhanced SFT creates a buffer zone to levitate stress from system operators. So long

as the input uncertainties are well quantified, a potential binding constraint pool will
be created based on intervals. The two challenges we face are the time and space. It
took almost 40 minutes to screening through 15 million constraints, and initially took
over 6 GB memory space. These problems will be addressed in future work section.

6.1

Machine Learning Applications

Congestion forecasting tool aims to use DAM participant information, contin-
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Table 6.1: Enhanced SFT Test Result
Constraint Count 1 Constraint %2

1
2
3
4

5
6

Time

Memory

Step 0 Coarse3

243848

1.59%

28 Minutes

6.3 GB

Step 0 Stacking 4

243848

1.59%

116 Seconds

210 Byte

Step 0 Unique 5

130740

0.85%

81 Seconds

112 Byte

Step 1

1358

0.01%

703 Seconds

-

Step 2

177

0.00%

350 Seconds

-

Step 2 Price Constraint6

153

0.00%

589 Seconds

-

Constraint count at each stage
Dominating constraint percentage after each screening step
Modified step 1
Aligning constraints into a three-dimensional matrix
Determine the uniqueness of constraints
Include the price constraints in step 2

gency planning, assets uncertainties to create a pool of potentially congested lines.

When more information becomes available, such as renewable and load forecasting,
we can use machine learning technique to predict when a constraint will become bind

ing in real time, and the power flow bounds of the constraint. The entire congestion

forecasting tool workflow is composed of two major parts: offline deterministic power

flow analysis and online machine learning model. The output is a list of potentially
congested line in real time, sorted by severity index. Figure 6.3 shows the framework.
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Figure 6.3: DA-RT Congestion Forecasting Workflow
Offline deterministic power flow analysis is discussed in detail in the method

ology section, which contains two-step security constraint screening, SFT screening,
deviation analysis, and price constraints. The input to the power flow analysis model
is,

1. Base case solution - base case topology, generator parameters, load forecasted,
virtual bid/offer

2. Credible contingency - pre-selected contingency topologies
3. Asset uncertainty - historical bid/offer information, generation/load deviation

or confidence interval
The output to the model is,

1. Constraint pool - the complete list of potentially binding security constraints.
The list is screened from base case and contingency cases
2. Impact index - discussed in Deviation Analysis section, a list of security con
straints that is sorted by impact index in descending order
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Machine learning module currently has two scripts, one is a classification
algorithm to determine whether a security constraint is a dominating one. The inputs

are system-wide load and DAM constraint sensitivity factor. The other script is a

deep neural network (DNN) to predict the upper/lower bounds of targeted security
constraints. The input is the same as classification algorithm. Work flow is shown

in figure 6.4. Note that, in the future works, the module should include input of
generator deviation, and previous day commitment. More information introduced

into the module can improve the accuracy.

However, the increase in complexity

also bring burdens to model training. Feature selection and engineering is crucial to

determine the relevant features that are most valueable to train an accurate model.

One of the challenges pointed out in figure 6.4 is that DAM security con
straints, i.e. watchlist security constraints, are a subset of all security constraints.

RTM topology is not one of the contingencies considered in DAM. This creates the

situation where RTM security constraint pool is significantly larger in both spatial
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and temporal perspective. In the system operator perspective, RTM data is available

every 5 minutes, where DAM market clearing is in 60 minutes intervals. Using DAM
market information to predict RTM status is lacking of efficient data, similar as under

sampling.

The last part of the workflow is by combining the machine learning results
with the deterministic power flow analysis. We replaced the power flow bounds used

to calculate the severity index with the power flow bounds predicted by DNN to create

a new set of severity index. By inspecting both indexes, the operator can make an
educated guess as to which constraints to look out for. The congestion forecasting

tool aims to provide the DAM team with an analytic method on choosing which
constraints to include in RTM.

6.2

Deep Neural Network Experiment Results

Neural Network is a machine learning model/strategy widely used in the indus

tries for forecasting and nonlinear approximations [111]. Deep learning in our research

refers to neural network with multi-layer perceptions. Figure 6.5 shows the network
diagram for a two-layer neural network structure representing (6.6). The input, hid

den, and output variables are represented by nodes, and the weight parameters are
represented by links between the nodes, in which the bias parameters are denoted by

links coming from additional input and hidden variables x0 and z0. Arrows denote

the direction of information flow through the network during forward propagation.

(6.6)

W is the weight and bias parameter group. ω represents the weights and h(·) is

a nonlinear activation function, we use the non-sigmoidal rectified linear unit (ReLU),
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σ(x) = max(x, 0), for this experiment [112]. The neural network model is a nonlinear
function from a set of input variable xi to a set of output variable yk controlled by a
vector w of adjustable parameters. Forward propagation and backward propagation

are utilized to calculate the weights. It is thoroughly discussed in [113]. We used
ADAM as our optimizer [114]; it is a built-in to tensor-flow [115]. (6.7) is the typical
loss evaluation, where tn is the prediction vector. By minimizing the loss, our goal
is to determine the best weights, w, that yields the most accurate prediction for the

neural network model.

(6.7)

Security constraint screen step 2 solves problem (C), the objective is the

power flow upper bound of line l. It would be extremely time-consuming to solve
N-1 contingency for all 186 line outage contingencies of the IEEE-118 bus system.
Our goal of the DNN is to replace the extensive LP programming with a trained

neural network. The training input of DNN is [hour, branch index, flow direction,

contingency index, individual loads and 118bus system N-1 contingency sensitivity

factor], input vector dimension is [123

×

1]. The output is [power flow upper bound

Fι, power flow lower bound Fl], the output vector dimension is [2

set size is 20 million = (185 + 1)
branches×^ direction

×#

* 186 * 2 * 24 * 12,

periods

×#

×

1]. The training

(185 contingencies + base)

×#

scenarios. During training, we used an 80/20

train/test data split, input is scaled by normalization, the dropout rate is 0.2 and 10
folds of cross validation.
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Figure 6.5: Two-layer Neural Network Diagram
Figure 6.6 shows the DNN results on IEEE-118 bus with N-1 contingency.

Note that not necessarily more nodes and layers will make the prediction better. In
our case, we attempted to predict the upper and lower bounds of power flows post
DAM SCUC with added uncertainties. Experimental result shows that two hidden
layers with 80 and 55 nodes will have the least loss value.

In figure 6.6, the x-axis is the actual upper/lower bounds which has been

calculated by the linear programming method (step 2), and the y-axis is the predicted
upper/lower bounds by the DNN. It is observed that for constraints with lower power

flow bounds, the variance of prediction could be larger than the ones with higher
bound values. In other words, the prediction is more accurate for constraints with

larger power flow bounds. We can also observe that non-zero predictions while the

ground truths are zero (dots reside on the y-axis while x is equal to zero). These
predictions are due to the bound calculation are zeros in the training set.

It is

unavoidable for the IEEE-118 bus system. We imagine that real world system will
have less zero bounds.
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Figure 6.6: DNN on IEEE-118 Bus N-1 Contingency

Table 6.2 shows the DNN dominating constraint prediction in comparison
with the deterministic methods. During training stage, we evaluated N-1 contin

gency power flow upper/lower bounds with 24 hours of data. The base case is the
dominating constraints screening by the proposed two-step methods. ’’Base +” is

the base case data with 10% load side uncertainty and generation deviation post
SCUC calculation. The dominating constraint pool increased from 66 to 101 due

to increasing uncertainty. Next, we trained the model from the previous discussion
and used an isolated data set for prediction. Results in ”DNN” shows that 69 out

of the 101 security constraints are dominating. Lastly, we verified that 53 out of the

59 security constraints are truly dominating. With our training setup, completely
calculating step 2 LPs would take over 60 minutes. However, with DNN we can reach

almost identical accuracy without a fraction of a second. This is being interpreted as

a scenario where we trade space for time. Offline training can be done where time is
abundant, and hard drive space is unlimited. Once we need to determine the dom

inating constraints in real time, the trained model can quickly calculate the power
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flow bounds with good accuracy.
Table 6.2: DNN Dominating Constraint Prediction
Constraints

Step 1

Base
Base +
DNN

69192
69192
101

6896
9649
NA

66 (0.10%)
101 (0.15%)
69 (0.10%)

Verify

69192

8075

53 (0.08%)

Step 2

Figure 6.7: Power Flow Difference Comparison Actual vs. Predicted

Figure 6.7 shows the power flow difference between the real power flow,

(fl,f), and DNN predicted power flow bounds, (f^nn,f)lnn).

The metric is cal

culated as in (6.8) and (6.9). The mean is 0.32% with a standard deviation of 5.29%.

DNN predicted power flow bounds are very accurate in this case study.

(6.8)
(6.9)
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Classification Dominating Constraints

6.3

Classification algorithm is well known as supervised learning technical in machine

learning. In this section, we apply classical classification algorithms [111] to predict

whether a constraint is dominating and training input is the same as DNN. Algorithms

utilized are logistic regression, KNN, SVM, kernel SVC, naive Bayes, decision tree
and random forest. Following is the standard definition of measurement matrix, we
also use the confusion matrix to quantify our results, table 6.3.
• True Positive (TP): Observation is positive, and is predicted to be positive.
• False Negative (FN): Observation is positive, but is predicted negative.
• True Negative (TN): Observation is negative, and is predicted to be negative.
• False Positive (FP): Observation is negative, but is predicted positive.

Table 6.3: Confusion Metric
Predicted 0

Predicted 1

Actual 0

True Negative

False Positive

Actual 1

False Negative

True Positive

Accuracy, recall, precision and F-measure are calculated as follows. The met

ric that caused most concern is the False Negative results. False negative measure
ments are the actual dominating constraints being indicated as redundant. Typically,

redundant constraints would only cause the SCUC to take longer to solve, but miss
ing dominating constraints will alter the optimal solution, insufficient dispatch may

occur.

(6.10)
(6.11)
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(6.12)
(6.13)

Table 6.4 shows the machine learning results with various methods. From

the data, our biggest challenge is the imbalanced data set, 5% of the constraints are
dominating and 95% are redundant. Training with imbalanced data set may cause

the algorithm to be over optimistic, and even with high accuracy, the application is
insignificant due to the majority of the result to be indicated as redundant. Typically,
undersampling, oversampling and SMOTE are implemented to tackle the problem.
We used the standard Python package = Easyensemble to under sample the data set,

i.e. only taking 10% of the sample (5% true and 5% false) in each training data set,

keep on shuffling in the false data. Kernel SVM showed promise.

Table 6.4: Classification Result

Logistic Regression
13
41

36602
291
Naive Bayes

33075
214

3529
118

36490
296

Kernel SVC

SVM

KNN
125
36

36600
296

15
36

Decision Tree

Random Forest

36491
172

36467
155

124
160

36585
263

30
69

148
177

Table 6.5 shows the results from undersampled kernel SVM. During training
with 10% of data set, only 1 constraint was false negative. When using the entire data

set for prediction, we were not only able to capture 2 dominating constraints. Kernel
SVM is the best classification algorithm we found to produce the lowest false negative,

while having an acceptable accuracy rate. The downside is the recall value is high,
almost 100%, and precision is low, around 25%. This is due to the 4868 redundant

constraints we were not able to detect. Overall, classifying dominating constraint
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is a trade-off between whether we want few missing dominating constraints or less

redundant constraints.

Table 6.5: Undersampled Kernel SVM Result

6.4

Clustering Experiment Results
Different line outage contingencies may have similar impact on the sensitivity

factors on the same branch. We ran the unsupervised learning, i.e. clustering, on

IEEE-118 bus system with 186 branches. The goal is to reduce the number of con
tingencies needs to be considered in congestion forecasting tool. In this experiment,

for each branch, input X = [# contingencies, # bus] = [1 + 185, 118]. Note that
each branch has 186 data entries, and each has 118 features. Perform clustering on
each branch (186 times), clustering algorithm is kMeans. Measurement of distance

is Within Cluster Sum of Squares (wcss) or Sum of Squared Error (distortion). Use

elbow method to find an optimal k (number of clusters).

90

Figure 6.8: IEEE-118 Bus N-1 Contingency Clustering
From figure 6.8, we can observe that 9 branches have a sensitivity factor of 0 with

over all contingencies, maybe due to islanding, which cannot be clustered. Out of

177 branches that can be clustered, the majority of the branch SF can be clustered

using 10 to 15 clusters. In other words, 186 contingencies can be reduced into 10 to
15 contingencies. The elbow method shows that 13 cluster is the optimal number of

contingencies that can be condensed into.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
7.1

Conclusions

In this research, we propose to build a watchlist of potentially binding security

constraints to tighten the SCUC formulation, which helps to improve solution quality
and shorten solution time. We propose a two-step approach as a screening process to

identify and eliminate the non-binding security constraints in the SCUC formulation.
In order to give MIP model a warm start, power injection uncertainty and
initial commitment are also incorporated. Thus, potentially binding constraints are
marked. Potentially non-binding constraints are set as lazy in the MIP solver, the
size of the problem is further reduced.

We also introduced software acceleration

techniques to improve performance of the screening process. Data driven security

constraint screening process is tested on IEEE-118 bus system and MISO test cases,

which proves to be effective. Our work has been published in [116,117].
This research also presents a data driven approach to forecast congestion
patterns in the Real Time Market.

MISO is interested in congestion forecasting

because constraints that are missed in the Day Ahead but bind in Real Time could
increase congestion funding concerns and result in a suboptimal unit commitment
solution. The ability to forecast congestion is an important need for forward processes,

to ensure market alignment and reliability.
The approach comprises two portions: a deterministic portion that leverages

previous research done on the security constraint screening; followed by a machine
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learning portion that uses well known algorithms to solve two problems - a binary
classification problem to predict which constraints will bind, and a regression problem
to predict the bounds of the constraints.

The deterministic portion leverages the High-Performance Power Grid Op

timization (HIPPO) tool, which was developed by MISO research and development
team (along with partners). The objective is to provide the operators with a list of
potentially binding constraints. Along with this list, the upper and lower bounds of

potential flow on the constraints is provided, which could be used as the training in
put to the machine learning portion. The uncertainty due to generators not following

dispatch, and renewable & load forecast errors, is considered.

The machine learning approach was tested on an IEEE-118 bus system. These
preliminary results show that the basic concept of utilizing machine learning models
to predict binding constraints has some promise. Further studies should be conducted

using real MISO system data, in order to fully evaluate the approach. The potential
benefit is to provide the Day Ahead operators with a tool for supporting decision

making regarding modeling of constraints.

7.2

Future Work

The proposed two-step security constraint screening method can significantly

shorten optimization time of DAM SCUC. In order words, it helps to increase social

welfare. A variety of applications can be derived from it, and the challenges need to
be addressed.

1. The proposed offline-online method can only be applied when there is no net
work topology change during online stage.

The dual variables produced in

offline stage are not valid for online calculation, if the LP model changes, i.e.
different network topology. Traditionally, network operator uses Line Outage
Distribution Factors (LODF) to estimate the power flow impact on monitored
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lines due to line outage. It is worthwhile to investigate the impact.
2. Virtual participants are financial players in DAM, total bid and offer quantity

accounts for about 45% of total market capacity. The virtual power cleared in
DAM, is a financial tool that helps breach the gap between DAM and RTM.

Even though the virtual power would create physical congestions, the price
signal, when created, can help us estimate RTM congestion status. Heuristic

methods can be applied to estimate the virtual power signal, and it can lead
to a much narrower net power injection range, which would further eliminate

redundant security constraints.
3. DAM is a financial market, and RTM is a physical market.

Real-time grid

security is a crucial component in daily power system operation. We have been

working on the DAM so far. We can extend the research to estimate real-time
congestion forecasting/management by estimating the difference between the
two markets from historical data.Creating a watchlist of security constraints for

a system operator to monitor in real-time would yield a short but creditable

potential congestion.

7.2.1

Verify Assumptions

We made few assumptions that needs to be verified with regard to the divergence

between DAM and RTM.
1. Generator deviation - We assume that generator deviation can be quantified or

constrained by ramp rate, or standard deviation. And the deviation can capture
the shift in power injection between the two markets. The assumption needs to
be verified in perspective of nodal injection error and optimal solution shift.
2. Deviation distribution - Assuming that the distributions are uniform or normal,

we used the sampling method to simulate real-time injection. Does the real-time
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deviation follow this behavior?

3. Real-time topology - we assume that real time topology is one of the credible

contingencies in SFT. The topology shift needs to be checked amongst, DAM,

RTM and credible contingencies included in SFT.

7.2.2

Challenges in Deterministic Approach
(Power Flow Analysis)

Majority of the work done in deterministic approach is purely based in the per
spective of DAM. As shown in Figure 5.8, the question becomes whether the newly

drawn circle (deviated feasible solution set) covers the real time solution.

1. Quantify the gap between DAM and RTM in terms of asset deviation (instead
of financial means) - in terms of power injection, sensitivity factor, power flows

(direction) and objective value.

2. Identify congestion driver - deviation of generator, load, virtual or renewable?
3. Reduced calculation time - the power flow analysis takes a minute to complete,
and computation efficiency needs to be addressed.

7.2.3

Challenges in Heuristic Approach
(Machine Learning)

1. Sensitivity factor variation - Line outages create topology change; sensitivity
factor is the direct measurement of topology change in a DC network. Credible
contingencies that contain all the line outage definitions are a part of input to

the SFT module. We have observed that majority of line outages only affect a
small portion of the entire network, and some contingencies have similar effect
on the topology change. It is possible to group these contingencies together to

reduce the amount of “duplicated” security constraints. If given the entire set
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of contingencies (n — k), we can perform statistical analysis on the sensitivity

factors, and understand how much they vary and the impact on the power flow

bounds.

The current study created the mapping/transfer function between

power flow bounds to power injection bounds, i.e. (f, f) = G(∕,"". C""i. If we
also include sensitivity factor, the function becomes (f, f) = G(Pιnj,Pιnj, Γ, Γ).

2. Metric that evaluate the gap between DAM and RTM - Future study is required
to quantify the gap between DAM and RTM. Quantifying the gap is one crucial

question. What metric should we use? Traditionally, we use money and asset
deviation as measurement. However, this method is flawed in terms of capturing

the congestion drivers, i.e. it may show correlation but very hard to deduce the
congestion cause.

3. Feature selection - Currently, we are using sensitivity factor, system load and
topology information to predict the power flow bounds. When more features

are introduced, key features need to be identified through feature engineering
or PCA.

4. Model precision - Power system (power flow) behaviors vary hourly and season
ally. Specific models should be trained to suit the situation.

7.2.4

Alternate Approaches for the Deterministic Method

1. MISO enforces a shift factor cutoff (1.5%). However, the flow in such instances

still contributes to the SE flow. Thus, we could use the Hippo SFT without the

cutoff, then we can evaluate the impact on constraints. We could consider the
DA MTLF case (i.e. without virtuals, use the forecasted load for next day).

2. Another approach could be to use the DA PROBE simulation tool. This can

evaluate many more contingencies than our market engine. We could run DA
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PROBE against the DA MTLF case. The advantage is that the inputs are in

CSV format, and thus are relatively easy to change.
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APPENDIX
Code Documentation

1.1

General Requirement and Setup
This section discusses the codes that were designed to run the proposed algorithms

and simulations. The codes written for the two-step security constraint screening and
static analysis were tested on Python 2.7/3.6. Machine learning applications were

tested on Python 3.6 with Tensorflow 2.0. Use the requirement.txt and pip to install

the required packages. The following packages are necessary to run the code.
• Nypmy/Pandas/Matplotlib : matrix calculation, creating figures and reports
• Numba : Cython based numerical acceleration for Numpy
• Igraph : Required for HIPPO
• Xlrt/Xlwt : Output csv/xls files
• Gurobipy (8.0.5) :

Default MIP solver for HIPPO and security constraints

screening package
• Keras/Scikitlearn/Tensorflow : Machine learning packages
• Imblearn : Package that performs imbalance learning sampling, i.e. oversam

pling, undersampling.
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Security Constraint Screening and Congestion Forecasting Packages

1.2

The codes developed for the project mainly consisted in three packages, i.e.
watchlist-proto, sft and machine-learning-models. The scripts that run through the

entire congestion forecasting process are located in run-example folder. The following
section discusses in detail the purpose of each script and how to implement them. Ta
ble 1.1 lists the steps, actions and top level scripts associated with security constraint

screening in DAM and congestion forecasting.

1.2.1

Watchlist Screening Module

watchlist-proto - watchlist constraints screening functions. The package was originally

designed for the watchlist security constraint screening project. Prior to solving day
ahead SCUC cases, watchlist constraints were hand selected from a pool of highly

credible contingency pool. The watchlist security constraints screening tool filters
through the selected constraints and determines the list set of constraints that needs
to be modeled in the day ahead SCUC case. Usually, 50% security constraints are

determined to be redundant, and DAM SCUC solution time is shortened by 50% on

average.

1.2.2

Enhanced SFT Module

sft - is a standard power flow violation calculation after solving DAM SCUC. Hun

dreds of credible contingencies, line outage/generator outage, are pre-selected. SFT
module use the contingency topology to calculate the sensitivity factor matrix. SCUC

resulted dispatches are fed into SFT to calculate the power flow on each constraint.
Power flow that exceeds its limit will mark the constraint as potentially congested.

The constraint will be added back to the SCUC model for the next MIP optimization.
There are three function packages in this module,

1. read-data.py - read data from case file (developed by PNNL)
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2. preprocessing.py - read addition information from case file and establish

indexing for efficient numerical programming (developed by PNNL)
3. sft_calculation.py - calculate sensitivity factors for all credible contingencies,

determine power flow upper/lower bounds given the SCUC solution, and mark

the potentially binding security constraints.
Other functions include and not limited to,

nearestPD(A): for Cholesky solve, A matrix must be positive definite. However, in
realty, the admittance matrix can be slightly off to a true positive definite matrix.

This function rounds it up, so calculations can continue.
isPD(B): determine whether a matrix is positive definite.
read_pinj_from_file(file): read power injection from a SCUC solution file

build pinj interval(sft data, pinj_data): match the power injections read from

file, to the corresponding sensitivity matrix location.

sft(object): sft main function
1. compute base ptdf: compute the base case sensitivity factor matrix

2. calculate_lo_power_flow.deviation: calculate line outage power flow devia

tions. Note that this function only calculates the difference admittance matrix
3. calculate_lo_power_flow_dev_pct: calculate the power flow deviation as a
percentage of power flow limit.

4. build sc ptdf: build the complete sensitivity matrix for all contingencies,

5. sc prescreen: two-step security constraint screening
6. match_pnode_with_market: contingency topology is different to base case
topology, some pnode are not present in either/or base. This function attempt
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to match the pnodes.

7. calculate.ctg.power.deviation implements (3.35) in a modified form, shown

as the following equation. If the change of sensitivity factor from base multiplied
by the power injection bounds is larger than a threshold, it is considered to be

a potentially binding constraint, resulted from enhanced sft module.

8. build.amcey .matrix: build the A, M, C, E, Y matrices for Cholesky decom
position.

9. cholesky.solve: use decomposition method to solve the matrix inverse
10. solve ctg: calculate final values of sensitivity factor
11. check.violation.from.data: check power flow violation with the difference

matrix calculated by the decomposition method.
12. two_step_check_violation: use the two-step security constraint screening method

to determine power flow upper/lower bounds
13. onwste^maxmin: use the max value of power injection if the corresponding

sensitivity is a positive number, and if the sensitivity is a negative value, then

use the minimum power injection value. However, if the product is a negative
number, then use zero to truncate the result.

The matrix calculate is very

efficient.

1.2.3

Machine Learning Module

The machine learning module aims to breach the gap between day-ahead market
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and real-time market congestion status. Utilizing historical congestion information,

the machine learning module predicts a pool of potentially congested lines. When
new information becomes available, the machine learning module will calculate the
probabilities of a line is binding in real time. The machine learning model has two
major functions ( Process is shown in figure 1.1).

1. Classification: determine the probability of a line becomes binding in real time
using, logistic regression, knn, svm, kernal SVC, naive bayes and random forest
2. Deep neural network: using DNN to predict the upper and lower bounds of

power flow of a line
• Data Parsing

Learn ctg pf ub.py: the script can calculate the power flow upper/lower

bound of security constraints in IEEE-118 bus test system. It can also read
previous calculated results and perform offline-online calculation comparison.

Note that this script was originally written to test Step 2: Linear Programming
Based Offline Power Flow Maximization and Step 2: Dual Problem Based On
line Screening. Since step 2 calculates all the power flow upper/lower bounds of
N-1 contingency, we used this script to generate training data set for the DNN

machine learning algorithm
• Build and train model

classify_dom.py: classification algorithm to predict dominating security con
straints. Input is sensitivity factor matrix, and output is whether a constraint
is dominating or not

treat_imba: treat data imbalance problem.

Only 5% of the total security

constraints are dominating, using ensemble method/bootstrapping to create a
balanced dataset

try_other_methods: the best one we found is kernel SVC. If set try_other_methods
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to true, the script will run logistic regression, knn, svm, naive bayes and deci
sion tree methods

Gridsearch: enumeration method to find optimal hyper perimeter.

train_ann_n1: the script trains DNN to learn power flow upper/lower bounds
GridSearch table plot: plot loss against hyper-parameter sets

Createregressor: create regression model

GridSearchCV: grid search cross validation
dumpmodel: output model
• Testing and verification

classify~dom.py script uses k-fold validation, see cross validation section

Figure 1.1: Congestion Forecasting Framework (online)

1.3

Top Level Scripts

MIP full _scenarios.py: security constraint screening example script. The script

takes the day ahead SCUC case, and filters through the watchlist security constraints
and determines the least set that needs to be included in the case without jeopardizing
model integrity (feasibility region remains the same). There are 12 scenarios that can

be implemented individually. It is a combination of three types of algorithms, i.e.
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Table 1.1: Top Level Scripts of Congestion Forecasting

Action

Step

Script

1

Build day ahead market object

2

Run two-step security constraint screening

3

Solve DAM SCUC

4

Run enhanced SFT

5

Run deep learning networks

6

Run Classification to identify binding constraints

MIP_full_scenarios.py

screemsft _offline.py
traimann1.py

classify-dom.py

• PRES : two-step security constraints screening
• CI : confidence interval of previous commitment
• LZ : lazy constraint setting

PRES: two-step security constraints screening should be applied right after build

ing the market object, where watchlist security constraints are modeled. Choosing
this option will implement the two-step method. See 3.2 for details.

CI: MISO studies have found that the current day commitment is very similar to

previous day commitment (roughly 70-95%). Using the previous day commitment as

a warm start can possibly shorten the DAM SCUC solution time. Two sets of values
need to be fed into the engine, 1st is commitment information (binary variables,

generator commit status), and 2nd is the confident interval of the actual dispatch.

The dispatch confidence interval is derived from seasonal data sets. However, using
ramp rate to constraint the generating units with high volatility is also viable.

LZ: lazy constraint settings.

Not all dominating constraints (constraints that

shapes the feasibility region of the solution set) are binding at the optimal solution.
We cannot simply remove the constraints that we think would not bind, because the

feasibility region will be altered if not all dominating constraints are present in the

model. However, the lazy constraint concept in the optimization engine allows us to
“sudo remove” the nonbinding constraint for faster calculation. Lazy constraints are

user defined constraint that are believed to not bind at optimal solution. The solver
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will optimize the problem without lazy constraints at the start. Once a solution is
found, it is checked against the lazy constraints to see if any violation occurs. If so,

the violated constraints are pulled into the active model, and optimized again. And

iteration continues until no more violation occurs. The question is how to pick which

constraints are likely to bind. We know that a relaxed MIP model takes little time to
solve, even though the solution is inappropriate to what the true MIP solution is. It
offers insight where the true solution may reside. We proposed two methods, integer
relaxation (IR) and initial commitment (CI). Both methods require solving a relaxed

version of the MIP model, and using the solution to determine whether security

constraints needs to be set as lazy. Work flow and implementation are illustrated in
figure 3.2. For technical details, see 3.3.

Table 1.2 lists all the combinations we applied to the experiment data, the

detailed explanations are as follows,

0. base case solution. Build and optimize the DAM SCUC directly.
1. Build market model, relax integer variables, solve the LP model. Use the LP
solution and determine the power injections on each node. Introduce uncer

tainty margin to create a power injection bounds. Determines the power flow
bounds on all the security constraints (two-step), if the bounds are outside of

power flow limits, it will be kept in the MIP model, otherwise, set them as lazy
constraints. Optimize the MIP model with lazy constraints.
2. Build market model, relax integer variables, solve the LP model. Use the LP
solution to determine the power flow on each security constraints. Introduce a

threshold value, say 80%, if the power flow is greater than 80% of the power flow
limit, it has the potential of becoming binding, and it will be kept untouched

in the MIP model. Power flow with 80% or less of the power flow limit will be

set as lazy in the MIP model. Optimize the model.
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Table 1.2: Security Constraint Screening Scenario List

#
0

scenario

PRES

CI

LZ

base_noci_nolz

FALSE

FALSE

nolz

1

base_noci_pinj

FALSE

FALSE

pinj

2

base_noci_flow

FALSE

FALSE

flow

3

base_ci_nolz

FALSE

TRUE

nolz

4

base_ci_pinj

FALSE

TRUE

pinj

5

base_ci_flow

FALSE

TRUE

flow

6

pres_noci_nolz

TRUE

FALSE

nolz

7

pres_noci_pinj

TRUE

FALSE

pinj

8

pres_noci_flow

TRUE

FALSE

flow

9

pres_ci_nolz

TRUE

TRUE

nolz

10

pres_ci_pinj

TRUE

TRUE

pinj

11

pres ci flow

TRUE

TRUE

flow

3. Apply previous commitment information to the model, i.e. unit commitment
and dispatch confidence interval. The option to set commitment is in the solu

tion “hint”. The MIP is still bounded by DAM case file input, just the initial

node to be explored is set by previous commitment.

4. Combining 3 and 1. Set initial commitment before optimization, solve LP, use
pinj method to set lazy constraint. Optimize MIP model.

5. Combining 3 and 2. Set initial commitment before optimization, solve LP, use
flow method to set lazy constraints. Optimize MIP model.
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6. Build the DAM SCUC model. Apply two-step security constraint screening
method, determine the redundant constraints and remove them prior to op

timizing the MIP model.

This method, when compared with 0, shows how

effective the two-step method is.
7. Combining 6 and 1. Prescreen and remove redundant constraints. Use “pinj”
method to set constraints as lazy in the MIP model prior to optimization.

8. Combining 6 and 2. Prescreen and remove redundant constraints. Use “flow”
method to set constraints as lazy in the MIP model prior to optimization.

9. Combining 6 and 3. In 6, the power injection bounds are deterministic, i.e.
using the asset’s physical limit. This conservative approach is relaxed in this
method. Instead of using the absolute bounds of uncertainty, we can use dis

patch confidence interval, the result will be a subset of 6.

And the subset

difference can be set as lazy constraints prior to solving the MIP model.
10. Apply two-step security constraint screening before 4.
11. Apply two-step security constraint screening before 5.

screen_sft_offline: After solving DAM SCUC, the resulted dispatch is fed into the

SFT model to test credible contingency power flows. We took the same input, i.e.
dispatch and credible contingency topologies and applied security constraint screen

ing. Remaining security constraints would be a robust set of potentially congested

constraints. See section VI for details. The work flow is summarized as follows,

1. Build DAM model and GUROBI MIP model, SCUC = set-model(market)
2. Solve MIP, mc.optimize()
3. Build SFT model, i.e. contingencies that were deemed to be credible sft-test =

sft(sft-data)
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4. Separate contingency sensitivities factors into base case and contingency matrix,
the operation is only done on the contingency matrix to take advantage of sparse
matrix calculation. sft-test.compute-base-ptdf()

5. Input deviation (generator, renewable, load), calculate uncertainty margin,
pinjJ>ounds = getjpnodejpinjfrom_mc_with_dev_or._std(·). Note that the gen
erator deviation can take a percentage increase, i.e. say 7%, it will increase the

uncertainty bound on generator dispatch to be between 93% and 107% around

the SCUC solution. This bound is capped by generator limits and ramp rate.
One can also use generator deviation standard deviation. The code will calcu

late the 95% confidence interval as the uncertainty bound. Note that we only
consider normal distribution. Load deviation input is a fixed percentage and

default value is 5%. Wind generation uncertainty default value is 20%. We can
improve this in the future to treat it as a distribution.

6. Determine power flow bounds based on contingencies and power injection bounds.

Note that, due to the large number of security constraints, we applied 3 layers
of screening, described as follows,

6.1. Step 0: coarse scan, max power injection on all the nodes with positive
sensitivity factors, and minimize power injection on all the nodes with

negative sensitivity factors. Calculate power flow. This step is numeri
cal, which takes very little time to solve. However, it does not take into
consideration realistic dispatch

6.2. Step 1: use unique function on the remaining constraints from step 0.
DAM will only model 1 constraint per line (this is due to the financial
settling scheme). This step is done after step 0, because operating unique
operation on large matrix is very expensive

6.3. Step 2: apply uncertainty induced power injections to DAM model solu
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tion. Use the two-step security constraint screening method to determine

the potential binding security constraints

6.4. Step 3: Introduce a tolerance value, which is the max MW allowed to be
violated before it is deemed to be binding (see chapter IV for details.)
7. Determine/output potential binding constraints (see chapter V for details)

powenflow.deviation: apply generator deviation statistics to the security con

straint screening tool, and determine the uncertainty bounds of power flows on the
selected constraints. See chapter V for details.

Processes discussed in this section follows the work flow shown in figure 1.2.
Minor scripts are discussed next,

cgs read market: function that calls security constraint screening step 1 and 2 with
variations.

cgs read mc: functions that read the results of DAM solution and determines the
true domination constraints. Some functions are used for verification purposes.

cgf.deviation: This script contains functions that create the price constraints. Add
uncertainty to the results of DAM solution and resolve the power flow upper and

lower bounds of selected security constraints. Mapping uncertainty limits of power
injections to uncertainty limits of power flow. Also introduce price constraints (budge
of uncertainty) to congestion forecasting process, refer to price constraints (budget of

uncertainty) section.
steplfcn: For security constraint screening step1, derivation and explanation, see
methodology section.
Step 1 is numerical method, the idea is to sort sensitivity factor on a constraint

in descending order, if the sum of power injection on the respective node multiplied by

the sensitivity factor can be greater or equal to the power flow limit, the constraint
have the potential of becoming binding.

This method is the necessary (but not

sufficient) condition for line congestion. Step1 decouples individual constraints from
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the MIP model, which is parallel processing friendly. We used python numerical
calculation acceleration package NUMBA to help with computation efficiency.
step2fcn: For security constraints screening step2, derivation and explanation, see
methodology section.

Essentially, there are three variations of step2. In short, step2 creates an LP
problem with the objective as the security constraint under consideration, the con

straints are all the rest of the security constraints in the SCUC model, load balance.
Then, to optimize the model, if the objective, maximized power flow, is greater than

the limit, the security constraint has the potential to become binding. The first vari
able is called the feasibility check, which is set the objective of the LP problem to be

zero, set the targeted constraint as a constraint, and it is greater than the power flow
limit, all other constraints remain the same. If this problem is feasible, meaning the
target constraint can be greater than its limit, the constraint is marked as dominating.
We will get the upper and lower bounds of the power flow by solving the LP problem

completely. This will be the 2nd variation. However, the complete solution of the LP
problem takes quite long to solve. The 3rd variation is the complete solution to the
problem and retrieve the dual variables of the LP problem. This is needed for Online

method.
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Figure 1.2: Congestion Forecasting Framework (offline)
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